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'Cc t5ABSTRACT
The pension reform in Kazakhstan was instituted to remove a deteriorating  and
costly pay-as-you-go  (PAYGO) system with limited revenues,  a relatively low worker
to pensioner ratio, and accumulating pension arrears. Analysis  was conducted  to assess
whether the economy could sustain a radical reform, which would make the implicit
pension debt explicit.  Fortunately, Kazakhstan's external debt was relatively light.
Further,  the  pension reform  was part  of  a three-pronged financial sector reform
including privatization and development of internal capital markets.  Although the
analysis of future benefits was far from thorough, the general optimism about future
economic growth  and high rates of return,  in  light of the Chilean experience, led
Kazakhstan policymakers to discontinue the PAYGO system while maintaining rights
accrued  before January 1, 1998.
The first section of this report reviews the reform and provides a synopsis of
the  thinking behind its development, including the  events leading up to  it and the
failings of the PAYGO system. This is followed by an analysis  of key macroeconomic
and beneficiary issues that were addressed while developing the  reform.  First, the
initial  1997 analysis of fiscal sustainability is  reviewed.  Next,  using an updated
forecasting model, the costs of reform are reexamined.  In retrospect, it would have
been preferable  from a fiscal perspective,  to reduce current pensions  to a greater  extent,
although this may not  have been possible.  Nonetheless, the reform does not  add
unduly to the fiscal burden of Kazakhstan. In the future, issues  related to the design  of
benefits will become increasingly  important.
In the second section, the  administrative, business, and regulatory structures
created  by  the  pension  reform  legislation are  described.  These  include  the
establishment of  completely new private-sector institutions - pension funds, asset
management companies (AMCs),  and custodian banks, as well as a state pension fund.
In addition, a combined payment center/pension clearinghouse  was adopted.
In the third section, the progress of these entities in meeting the objectives  of
the  reform  is evaluated, particularly  in  terms  of  regulatory and  financial market
performance.  In addition, this section discusses  the decision of the World Bank to
support the Kazakhstan  pension reform.  The support was both financial  and technical.
The review concludes that: (1) the ambitious reform was inevitable; (2) the reform is
progressing in a relatively satisfactory manner despite external shocks that restricted
economic growth and capital market development; but that (3) many additional steps
need to be taken if the pension reform is to live up to original objectives,  particularly
in the areas  of benefits,  regulation, and portfolio diversification.TABLE  OF CONTENTS
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ANNEX:  MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
..II.  THE BASIS  FOR REFORM
A bold and far-reaching  Kazakhstan pension reform law was enacted in June
1997 and inaugurated in January  1998.  The reform immediately transformed the
pension system from an expensive pay-as-you-go  (PAYGO) system to  one of fully
funded,  defined contribution  accounts. The previous system suffered from  three
overarching problems: (1) a Soviet-style  structure of benefits characterized by  early
retirement ages, special privileges, and high replacement rates, particularly for short-
service workers; (2) excessively  high payroll taxes for pensions  totaling 25.5 percent of
the  wage bill;  and  (3) a  continually declining revenue base which  resulted in  an
estimated two-thirds of projected revenue collected from state owned enterprises and
corporate employers and, at most, an estimated one percent of revenue from small
business in the private sector.  In addition, all attempts at a more restricted reform of
the  PAYGO  system had ended in  failure - without an increase in  revenues or  a
reduction in cost.
The new system, a funded system based  on investments,  is intended to promote
self-sufficiency  instead of government dependence,  to reduce government expenditures,
to  encourage savings and promote the  development of the  capital market.  As of
January  1, 1998, the  pension system was transformed into  one  of  fully  funded,
individual, defined contribution accounts mandated for all workers on an immediate
basis. Accrued entitlements to old pensions were maintained, however, so that upon
pension age workers would receive  pensions for service  prior to January 1, 1998  from
the  old system and benefits for service after January 1, 1998 from their  individual
accounts.  Unlike reforms in other transition economies,  the new system covered all
workers of all ages.' Kazakhstan  preferred a Chilean approach  rather than adopting the
'Palacios  and Whitehouse  (1998)
1more  cautious  approaches  of  Poland,  Hungary,  or  Latvia,2 the  other  transition
economies that had almost simultaneously  reformed their pension  systems.
Financing.  Current  PAYGO  pensions  and  future  partial  PAYGO  pensions
initially were to be financed from a 15-percent wage tax paid by employers,  a reduction
from  the  1997 contribution  rate of 25.5-percent.  This  form  of financing  was selected
rather  than  the  recognition  bond  approach  instituted  in  Chile.  Over  time,  as
obligations  under  the old system would  be phased-out, the  15 percent  payroll  tax was
to be reduced as well.  Starting January  1, 1999, however,  payroll  taxes earmarked  for
social  programs  (pensions,  unemployment  insurance,  and  health  insurance)  were
amalgamated  into  a  single  21-percent  payroll  tax  allocated  to  local  government.
Nonetheless,  when  the  PAYGO  pension  expenditures  decline  in  the  future,
presumably  the overall tax burden  can still be reduced as well.
Pensions  under  the  new  system  are based  on  contributions  of  10 percent  of
earnings allocated to individual accounts and invested in financial  instruments  through
pension  accumulation funds.  Competing  accumulation  funds,  including  one  managed
by the state, have been established.  The pension  reform  legislation is underpinned  by
complementary  safety-net legislation that  provides  social allowances for disability, old
age, and the loss of a wage earner.
Investments.  The allocation  of investments  by the pension  funds, through  asset
managers,  is  tightly  limited.  Both  the  state  and  non-state  funds  must  invest  a
minimum  of  50  percent  of  their  assets  in  Government  securities.  The  State
Accumulation  Fund (SAF), by law, can invest up to 40 percent  of assets in designated
national  (state-owned) bank deposits  and up to  10 percent  in the issues of international
institutions  such the World  Bank.  The non-state  accumulation  funds  (NSAFs) have
greater  flexibility in their  investments.  In addition  to  investments  in  bank  deposits,
2For  a detailed description of Poland's reform, see Chlon, Gora, and Rutkowski (1999). For
that of Hungary, see Palacios  and Rocha (1998),  and for Latvia, see Vanovksa (2000)  and Fox
and Palmer (1999).
2they may place  a maximum of up to 30 percent in Class A corporate securities. Class
"A" securities  are listed on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KSE)  and must have had at
least one  year  of  audited financial statements  in  accordance with  international
standards.
Public  Information. Government realized the need to inform the public about
this substantial  change in the pension system and responded, in part, by a nationwide
effort to put key reform officials  before the public, in person and through the media,
to provide information about the reform at the highest level. Continued concentrated
public information efforts still are necessary  to win public confidence and ensure that
mandatory pension contributions are made. Government prepared a comprehensive
plan for such a public information campaign,  with a timetable for the implementation
of the strategy.
That  strategy was first  supported  by  technical  assistance from  the  Asian
Development Bank (ADB),  which provided some $900,000  million to conduct surveys
on the knowledge  and attitudes of the population towards the pension reform.  These
findings  directed  further  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development
(USAID) technical assistance  through  grant funding amounting to  about $800,000.
USAID  assistance included  seminars  for  the  press,  trade  unions,  employer
organizations,  and government officials  throughout the country.  While posters (some
1,500) and  leaflets (around  600,000 copies)  were  widely  distributed,  the  most
innovative approach  was the incorporation of number of episodes  dealing with pension
reform  on  Crossroads ("Perekrestok"),  an  extremely  popular  television  series.
Technical assistance  under World Bank funding is about to start, following up on these
earlier efforts. 3 Educational (and lobbying) has also been provided by the Association
of Pension Funds (APF), an organization initiated with  TACIS funding. 4 The APF
3 The World Bank has funding for about  US$1 million for public  information.  A contract  should be
signed in the near future.
4A  second employer organization  has also been started and time will tell whether  both  will continue  to
be in operation in the long run.
3has distributed  a leaflet called "Questions and Answers" informing the  population
about the new pension system.
Fiscal  implications.  The pension reform program has incurred significant short-
term  fiscal costs.  But  when the  reform  was developed in  1997, projected costs
conformed to  a sustainable fiscal policy.  The incremental loss of revenues due to the
pension reform in  1998 was estimated at  1.7 percent of  GDP or  US$395 million.
Government programmed an adjustment in the budget of 0.7 percent of GDP for 1998
to  offset the transition  cost of the reform.  In other words, these reductions would
finance about  40 percent of the transition  deficit.  Initially, any additional loss in
revenue  was  to  be  made  up  almost  entirely  by  pension  fund  investments  in
government bonds.
In 1998, however, payroll tax revenues were only around two-thirds of those
collected in  1997.  The  shortfall was not  a result of  the  reform itself, however.
Through the reduction of the income tax, the tax base upon which the payroll tax was
collected was smaller.  Further, the responsibility for the collection of the 15-percent
payroll tax had been shifted from the oblasts to the tax administration. As a result, the
local authorities had little remaining incentive to encourage  enterprises to pay.  And,
last but not least, in 1998  and 1999,  tax revenues were severely hit by the domino effect
of  the  Russian  crisis  and  failing  commodity  prices.  In  the  longer  run,  the
centralization of tax collections, combined with improvements  tax administration, and
a stronger macroeconomic climate should increase  revenues  substantially.
A.  The Need for an Ambitious Pension Reform
The  pre-reform  system. Government decided on an ambitious pension reform
primarily as a result of serious arrears in pension payments in an environment that
made a more moderate reform unlikely.  The problems under the old system were
manifold (Table  1).  First, retirement ages, based on the former Soviet system, were
extremely low, at 55 years for women and 60 years for men.  While these ages were
4supposed to be raised in 6-month increments under 1996 legislation,  the increase was
unusual as workers could still retire at earlier ages  with a reduction in benefits,  which
would subsequently be topped-up to full value upon reaching normal retirement age.
In  effect, this meant that people continued to  retire at the same age.  The normal
pension formula was extremely generous at 60 percent of the  highest past wages
averaged over 12 months for workers with full service (20 years for women and 25
years for men).  Above that, the base was increased by one percent for each year of
service above the minimum.  In many occupations,  more than one year was credited
for each year of service
Table 1: Pre-Reform  System, 1996
Retirement  Ages  55  years  for men,  60  years  for men
Pension  Formula  60%  highest  wage,  1%  extra per year of service  for service
over  25 years  for men  and 20  years  for women
Pensioners  2.8 million  pensioners
Contributors  5 million  contributors
Actual  Replacement  Rate  36  percent  of average  wage
Arrears  5 months  of pension  payments
Pensions were paid to  2.8 million persons in mid-1996.  Of these, old- age
pensions accounted for  some 2.1 million.  About  19 percent of old-age pensioners
received pensions on  favorable terms with supplementary years of credited service.
Further, these pensioners received higher than average  pensions, as outlays for them
amounted to 23 percent of all old-age payments.  While statutory replacement rates
were very  generous, actual average replacement rates were much  lower than  the
formula would suggest because indexation trailed wage growth.  In July 1996  average
pensions were 36 percent of average  wages. In fact, throughout the 1980s  and 1990s,
the pension replacement rate ranged from a low of 24 percent of the average  wage in
1992  to a high of 42 percent in 1991.
5Collection.  In  mid-1996, employers  were  making  contributions  on  behalf  of
about 5 million workers.  This meant  that  1.8 workers  were paying for each pensioner,
an extremely low ratio compared to the population  demographics.  In other words,  the
system  dependency  ratio,  that  is the  ratio  of pensioners  to  contributors,  was 0.56 in
1995 while the old age dependency  ratio, that is the ratio of persons age 60 and over to
the working  age population  (age 20-59 years) was 0.18.  By comparison,  in the United
States, these  ratios  were  0.31  and  0.30  respectively.  Kazakhstan,  a  country  with
favorable  demographics  for  a  pay-as-you-go  pension  scheme,  had  a  high  system
dependency  burden  and  correspondingly  high  payroll  taxes  due  to  ineffective
collection  procedures  and  early  retirement  ages.  Essentially,  the  growth  of  the
informal  sector and the development  of wage arrears led to  a relatively  small tax base
relative  to  the  actual  labor  share  of  income  in  the  economy.  In  fact,  estimates
suggested that less than half of all potential  contributions  were actually collected.  This,
of course, is not just a problem  in Kazakhstan  but affects virtually  all CIS countries,  as
tax collection  shortfalls are much more  severe in the CIS than  in  Central  and  Eastern
Europe.
The  system  of  collection  and  payment  under  the  old  pension  system  was
inefficient  and ineffective. The  Ministry  of Labor  and  Social Protection  (MLSP) and
the  local  departments  of  social  protection  were  responsible  for  the  collection  of
pension  fund revenues and the delivery of benefits.  Each  'raion' 5 department  of social
protection  had a pension  fund department.  That  department  was responsible  for the
auditing  and  enforcement  of  contribution  collections.  Monthly  contributions  were
deposited  into  two  accounts.  Seventy percent  of collections  went  to  a raion  account
and the remaining 30 percent  were supposed to  be deposited into a central  account for
reallocation to the oblasts.  The result of this  arrangement  was that  funds remained  at
raion  level until  all local pensioners  were  paid.  Further,  relatively  well off oblasts,
such as Almaty,  appeared not to  actively enforce  collection  compliance  once they had
5  The  relevant  administrative  units in Kazakstan  are  raions,  oblasts  and the center. Raions  consist  of
municipal  and rural  localities.  Oblasts  consist  of the total of regional  raions,  and the center
oversees  the  raions.
6sufficient funds to pay their own pensioners.  While collections under  this system were
aided  by  local  self-interest,  the  inefficiencies  in  allocation  called for  administrative
reform.  Local  authorities  actually  used  pension  fund  revenues  to  pay  for  family
allowances  based  on  the  premise  that  these  funds  would  be  reimbursed  by  local
budgets.  Since local funds were  generally insufficient,  these expenditures  frequently
were not repaid.
Arrears.  Under  the  former  PAYG  system,  considerable  arrears  in  collection
were accumulated on  the part  of contributing  employers,  with  the  duration  of back-
payments differing from  oblast to  oblast.  Prior  to  reform,  the accumulation  of arrears
- both  in  terms  of payments  and  contributions  -- was  growing.  On  January  1, 1996,
contribution  arrears from  enterprises  totaled 40 billion  tenge, 26 billion  tenge higher
than  one  year  earlier.  Contribution  arrears  from  local  and  republic  government
ministries  and organizations  amounted  to another  2.3 billion  tenge.  By July  1, 1996,
reported  contribution  arrears from  enterprises  were 49.6 billion  tenge - equivalent to
five months  of pension payments.  Further,  even if these arrears could have been made
up,  the  pension  fund  only  collected  taxes from  5 million  out  of an  estimated  labor
force  of  7.8  million.  Moreover,  collections  only  amounted  to  45-52 percent  of
potential  revenues due to the underreporting  of wages.
Contribution  arrears  and  the  general  state  of  non-compliance  led  to  a
significant backlog  in  pension  payments.  Pension  payment  arrears  were  26 billion
tenge at the beginning of the  1996 and peaked at 32 billion  tenge (2.5 percent  of GDP)
by the end of June  1996.  As a result,  Government  transferred  36 billion  tenge from
the  state budget  to  the  pension  fund  in  1997 to  cover payments,  including  arrears,
covering the deficit for the rest of the year, and paying other  administrative  expenses.
But  the  build-up  of  back pensions  had  begun  to  be  a  focal point  for  social unrest,
which,  ultimately,  opened  a  window  of  opportunity  for  the  enactment  of  the
Kazakhstan pension reform.
7With  this  as background,  the President  appointed  a task force to develop a plan
for  pension  reform  during  the  first  half of  1997 to  finally  overhaul  the  system  in  a
fundamental  way,  as partial measures had not  led to any reductions in cost. As a result,
the  reform  concept  was  outlined  early  in  1997, and  legislation  was  drafted  by  a
committee  of  experts,  during  an  April  retreat  outside  the  capital city  of  Almaty.6
According  to  one  of the intellectual  leaders of the  reform,  "the pension  reform  is an
integral  part  of  the  triangular  economic  development  strategy  encompassing
privatization,  capital  markets  development  and  the  pension  reform."7 Thus,  the
success of the reform  should, in part, be measured by this objective.
B.  The Transitional  Costs of the Reform
Initial  estimates.  The  fiscal  framework  for  1998 budget  was  designed  to
accommodate  an  increased deficit of  1.7 percent  of GDP  resulting from  the  pension
reform  for  a total  deficit of  5.5 percent  (Table  2).8  The  underlying  adjustment  in
recurrent  revenues  and  expenditure  items  equaled  a decline  of 0.7 percent  of  GDP.
Projections  of the  cost of transition  based on  Government's  actuarial model  indicated
that the implicit  government  debt would  amount to  110 percent  of 1997 GDP.
The  actuarial  projection  model  showed  that  in  the  absence  of  reform,  the
existing system costs would  have increased slightly in  1998, from 3.9 to  4.0 percent  of
GDP,  mainly  as a result of additional  pensioners.  With  reform, the cost  of the  new
system was estimated  to be 5.7 percent  of GDP.  The transitional  cost of reform  was
due to  the  reduction  in the payroll  tax rate from  25.5 percent  to  15 percent  in  1998,
which was estimated  to reduce gross inflows to the PAYG system by 30 billion tenge.
6 The capital was moved from Almaty to Astana (formerly  Akmola) in 1998.
7Marchenko,  (1998)
If funding from  privatization is omitted then  the overall fiscal deficit for  1998 was an
estimated 7.8 percent of GDP.
8Table 2:  The Transition Costs of Pension Reform
State Budget plus  1997  1998
Pension Fund  Former  No Change  1998  New  Loss of
(1997 tenge)  System  in Policies  System  Revenue
Retirement  Pensions  89.4  92.4  91.4  -I
Social  pensions  / allowances  19.8  21  21  0
Military  pensions  5.1  5.2  5.2  0
Gov't contrib.  to accumulation  funds  0  0  10.9  10.9
Total Outlays  114.3  118.6  128.5  9.9
Net payroll  taxes  48.4  48.7  28.2  -20.5
Gross inflows  to SPPC  70.2  70.5  41  -29.5
less,  gov't contrib.  - own employees  21.8  21.8  12.8  -9
Net Cost  to Government  65.9  69.9  100.3  30.4
Percent  of GDP  3.90%  4.00%  5.70%  1.70%
Source:  World Bank calculations.
Further  analysis  by  the  World  Bank  suggested  that  Government  could  borrow
the  full amount  to  finance the increase in the  fiscal deficit from  the  domestic  market
without  causing undue pressure on aggregate demand  as losses in public revenue would
be compensated by an increase in non-public  sector savings.  In  addition,  the revenues
from privatization  were also intended to buffer the costs of the reform from the impact
of the increased deficit resulting from the reduction  in the 10-percent payroll tax.
In terms of direct Government  compensation  costs, the reduction  in the payroll
tax rate for civil servants (as for all other  employers) was offset by the  10-percent cash
contribution  on behalf of employees to the accumulation  funds.  Subsequent regulation
required  the  10-percent contribution  to  be directly  deducted  from  wages.  While,  no
firm  statistical  data  are  available,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  private-sector
employers did not  increase wages in  1999 to offset this employee expense, but, during  a
period  of  inflation,  shifted  these  costs  from  employer  to  employee  though  lower
wages.
9Although the loss of revenues due to the pension reform was estimated at 1.7
percent of GDP in  1998, it was projected to  rise to 2.4 percent of GDP by 2008. A
steady rise in the transition cost resulted from anticipated reductions in the payroll tax
rate by one percent per annum, from  15 percent in  1998 to  5 percent in 2008. In
subsequent years, the forecasts showed that the incremental cost of the reform would
be gradually eliminated. By 2026, the total (not incremental) cost of residual PAYGO
pension system was projected to be 2 percent of GDP, considerably  less than pension
payments would have been under the old PAYGO system.
With  the  institution  of general-revenue financing for  the  residual PAYGO
pension system in  1999,  the analysis  of the incremental costs of reform appeared more
complicated, as payroll taxes were no longer connected to the pension reform.  The
post-reform loss in  revenue to  the tax  system, however, remains at 10 percent of
payroll - that is, the amount of the reduction in payroll-tax rates resulting from the
reform.  Thus, it is possible to  the  difference between the  costs of the unreformed
pension system and the costs of the residual PAYGO system less 10  percent of payroll.
This difference is the cost of the  reform - that  is, the  loss in  tax revenues to  the
consolidated  budget
Updated  estimates. In 2000, Government again estimated the annual costs of the
PAYGO system as part of its fiscal planning process."  These projections demonstrate
that total expenditures for the PAYGO system will be considerably less as a result of
the pension reform (Chart 1). But with life expectancy  at retirement reaching 12 years
for men and 20 years for women, it is not surprising that current pension costs are not
ID It is also  important  to remember  that at the time of the reform,  the 25.5  percent  payroll  tax
did  not cover  the costs  of the old system.
"The costs  of the pension  reform  are now  assessed  based  on the World Bank's  PROST  model
(adapted  for Kazakhstan)  using official  economic  assumptions  to make actuarial  projections
of the PAYGO  system. Earlier  estimates  were based  on a model  created  for USAID  to assist
the Kazakhstan  authorities  in their development  of the pension  reform.
10significantly reduced until 2012, when the cost of the reformed system is below the
pre-reform projection by  5 percent of GDP.  Further, the reform did not alter the
benefit formula for pensioners entitled to old-system  benefits,  although retirement ages
were raised and special early retirement provisions were suspended. After 2012, the
costs of  the  residual PAYGO  system decline dramatically as  a percent of  GDP
compared to  the  former PAYGO  system. In  fact, the  present discounted value of
pension payments is reduced by 43 percent after the reform over the period 2000-2050
compared to stream of expenditures  under the unreformed PAYGO case.
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Nonetheless, the new projections also show that transitions costs are greater
than initially forecast, probably as a result of reduced tax collections following the
Russian crisis, and subsequent employment shifts from the  formal to  the  informal
11economy.' 2 Consequently,  while  initial  projections  indicated  a first-year  deficit  of  1.7
percent  of GDP,  the  actual  deficit  came  in at 2.2 percent  of GDP.' 3
Updated  forecasts  indicate  that  the  transition  deficit  falls  slowly  until  2036.
The  discounted  value  of the  incremental  cost  (and  savings  in later  years)  is less than  0.2
percent  of the  discounted  value  of GDP  from  2000  to  2050.  In  other  words,  on  the
whole,  the  reform  is essentially  cost-neutral,  as the  reduction  in tax  rates  is close  to  the
reduction  in  pension  expenditures  over  time.  Under  the  old  system,  pension  costs
would  have  started  to  rise  in  2011  after  falling  for  10 years,  and  would  have  reached
their  2000  rate  in  terms  of GDP  by  2039,  rising  thereafter.  Thus,  the  pension  reform
creates  a  system  that  is  sustainable  for  later  in  the  century  as  these  increases  are
avoided.
The  Kazakhstan  pension  reform  is costly  relative  to  those  of  other  countries
since  the  PAYGO  formula  was  not  cut  back  (although  retirement  ages  were
standardized  and  lengthened).  Although  it is unlikely  that  an identical  pension  reform
could  have  been,  or  would  have  been,  enacted  under  the  deteriorating  economic
conditions  of  1999,  these  were  not  the  circumstance  in  1997.  At  that  time,  the
economy  looked  strong  and  world  conditions  favorable.  Hindsight  notwithstanding,
with  prudent  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  market-oriented  structural  changes,  the
12 These increases in the costs of reform  may also result from improvements  in the model  and
the  modeling  assumptions.  In implementing  the  PROST  model,  Government  consultants
updated  labor force and demographic assumptions. Unfortunately,  funding was not available
to  compare  the  output  of the  two  models under  identical assumptions.  Consequently,  the
independent  impacts  of  different  economic  conditions,  different  databases,  and  different
modeling  techniques  cannot  be determined.  The  economic  and  demographic  assumptions
used in the Kazakhstan PROST model are presented in Appendix I.
3  This is defined  as the  relative shortfall  in total tax revenues after pension reform  (due to  the
10-percentage point  reduction  in the payroll tax)..  Over  time, the need for this lost revenue  is
reduced  as  PAYGO  pension  expenditures  decline under  the  reform  relative  to  what  they
would  have  been otherwise.  Because post-reform  PAYGO  pensions  are now  financed  from
general  revenues,  and  not  from  payroll  taxes, usual  direct  comparisons  of pre-  and  post-
reform  payroll tax revenues can no longer be used to  determine the transition  cost.
12transitional  costs of the pension  reform are still affordable and potential  future  benefits
from financial market  development positive.
C.  Benefit  Structure
The pension  reform was intended  to send a strong signal to the population  that
times had changed and individual responsibility  had to replace the State as the provider
of first  resort.  Such a change in  mentality  is important  if the  transition  to  a market
economy  is to  succeed.  Initial  estimates by  Government,  based on  very  optimistic
economic  assumptions,  projected  that  a  10-percent  contribution  could  provide  a
replacement rate of around  60 percent  of prior  earnings for career workers.
1.  Normal  Pensions
Whether  replacement  rates can meet  the  60 percent  target  depends  upon  the
rate of return  to the contributors'  pension  accounts and the length  of the contributory
period.  A simulation  model using different  assumptions  than  those  of  Government
indicates  that  individual  replacement  rates  are  likely  to  be  less than  the  target  60
percent rate.
Pension simulations.  Table 3 presents estimates of total pensions  (PAYGO  plus
funded) for several age-cohort and work-history  groups based on average wages.  In the
simulation, individuals contribute  10 percent of their  wage from the start of the reform
until retirement  and receive a price-indexed pension  from retirement  until  death.  They
also receive a pension  from the PAYGO  system  that  is based on their  work  histories
prior  to  1998 relative to  full eligibility  (25 years for men  and 20 years  for  women)." 4
Projected  pensions are based on that  fraction  times  average earnings over  three  years.
For  the  funded  system,  administrative  costs  are assumed  to  take  up  10 percent  of
14 The pension upon which the pro-rating  proportion is applied is equal  to 60 percent of average
monthly earnings  over any three successive  years of work from January 1, 1995.
13contributions,  savings earn  a 3.5 percent  rate of return,  real wages grow at 2 percent,
with  zero inflation.  Individuals  start work at age 20 and retire at the official retirement
age.
Two  conclusions  emerge  from  these  simulations.  First,  initial  pensions  will
typically  replace less than  60 percent  of earnings.  If workers  want  to  have a higher
replacement  rate, they  will have to  save more  voluntarily.  Second, those  with  short
contribution  histories  (who  are  likely  to  include  women)  may  not  be  able  to
accumulate enough in their  pension  accounts to support  themselves adequately in their
old age. The reform could put these groups at risk.
Table 3: Initial  Total Replacement Rate (%)
As a Function  of Work History  and Starting Age
Age at start of reform
Work history  25 years  35 years  45 vears
40 years  30  34  44
35 years  27  31  36
30 years  24  28  33
20 years  18  22  30
Source: World Bank calculations.
While  current  rates  of  return  to  pensions  are  far  higher  than  initial
Government  assumptions,  and much higher than the return  assumed in the simulation
model,  these  high  rates  are not  likely  to  last in  perpetuity."5 And,  once the  stock
market  develops, funds can expect  greater  fluctuations  in  returns.  Emerging  markets
are generally subject to  greater  fluctuations  in than  developed  market  economies are.
Consequently,  false expectations  should  not  be raised about  the level of pensions the
reformed  system  can support.  Contribution  levels may  need to  be  raised and  other
changes made to approach  a 60 percent  target
15 While there are important  issues outstanding  with  regard to the  correct valuation  of pension fund
assets, the preponderance  of investments  in the  non-state funds have been in Eurobonds,  which
have had a international  market rate of return  well in excess of 10 percent.
14Benefit design and  annuity provisions.  The  creation of  a strong  insurance
industry is also necessary  to support the funded pension system. The National Bank of
Kazakhstan (NBK) has made the development of an insurance industry a top priority.
In  particular, a new insurance law has been completed and is to  be submitted to
Parliament by the  end of June 2000.  Although not perfect, it provides a generally
sound  framework  based  on  international  standards.  As  the  system  matures,
commercial insurers would provide pension payments for the funded system (under
options such as fixed-term  payments, single life annuities, joint and survivor annuities).
Until the industry is established, however, lump-sum distributions will be the major
source of financing.
In the interim, the MLSP has also started to develop plans  to provide pensions
directly through  the  government payment  system.  In  Latvia, pensions from the
notional defined contribution system and the future funded system will be paid in this
manner.  But, at the moment, neither Latvia nor Kazakhstan  has developed  a pay-out
mechanism that  is based on  sound annuity principles, and, as such, pensioners are
likely to receive  amounts that either exceed  or are less  than a fair actuarial  value.
2.  Minimum  Pensions.
Pensioners with full years of service (equal  to 25 years for men and 20 years for
women) are eligible to  receive a minimum pension if their combined pensions fall
below a minimum amount.  This minimum was set at 2,400 tenge per month under the
1998 budget law, a  level roughly equivalent to  70 percent of the  1997 subsistence
minimum described in the World Bank's poverty assessment.' 6 Allowing for the fact
that pensioners may have other sources of income, including self-production  of food
and  assistance of  relatives, a target of  70 percent of the  official minimum living
standard appeared reasonable. If these benefits were indexed for inflation, pensioners
with a substantial contribution  history would not be at risk of severe  poverty.
"World  Bank (1998a).
15Government has issued  a resolution that pensions  will be no lower in real terms
than the original 2,400-tenge  level.  By Presidential decree, minimum pensions, have
actually increased more than inflation, understandably in  response to  concerns that
pensioners had inadequate replacement  rates compared to their past earnings. Further,
rising energy prices can often take virtually all of a pensioner's income.  In 2000, the
minimum pension was 3,500  tenge (US$24.52),  or 28 percent of the average  wage. As a
general rule, the minimum pension is to be determined annually as part of the budget
process, on an ad hoc basis within the guidelines set by the government resolution.
The Pension Law simply states that a minimum will be provided.
While the minimum pension does not create a current fiscal drain, in future
years, Government may find that the costs  of the minimum pension rise considerably .
In particular, the contribution rate for funded pensions is quite low and is likely to
continue to  be low unless informal-sector  employment declines. If workers have the
opportunity to switch between formal and informal sector employment, future retirees
with sufficient work  years to  qualify under the  funded system could increase the
number of persons qualified  for the minimum pension considerably. If there is little or
no substitution between formal and informal sector employment, the number of aged
poor is also likely to grow placing pressure on social assistance  instead.
3.  Disability and Survivors'  Benefits.
As a result of pension reform, disability and survivors' benefits are no longer
provided as social insurance and are instead flat-rate allowances  unrelated to  years of
service  or salary."  The allowances  are funded directly through the budget and are no
longer a part of the pension system. Normal monthly disability benefits range from 3
17  While  unrelated  to service  or earnings,  benefits  for disability  are  not uniform. First,  there  are  three
disability  groups  ranging  from partially  disabled  to fully  disabled  and requiring  care. Second,  there
are  five  disability  categories  including  general  disability,  disabled  active  duty war veterans  including
nuclear  liquidators,  veterans  with post-service  disabilities,  war veterans  (not active  duty),  and
ecological  and nuclear  victims.  The general  principles  for these  benefits  are  in the Pension  Law.
The benefits  themselves  are  described  in the Law  on State  Social  Benefits.  The highest  benefits,  for
active  military  and police,  reach  10,875  tenge  (US$76.20).
16base-enumerates (2,175 tenge) to  6 base-enumerates (4,350 tenge).'8 Indexation  depends
on  changes in the  base enumerate,  which  is updated  annually  within  the Budget Law
according  to projected  increases in the  CPI. 19 Workers  eligible for invalidity  benefits,
whose disabling conditions  preclude  any possibility  of work,  face a sharp  reduction  in
their income if they earn above the average wage. 20 Similarly, low-wage earners in high
disability categories could receive higher income  from  disability  allowances than they
did prior  to disablement.
These allowances are intended  to  be an interim  measure, however.  In the long
run,  disability  and survivor's  benefits are to be provided  as annuities  through  private
disability  and  life insurance.  Currently,  government  is working  on  a draft concept
paper  for  the  new  disability  and  survivors  insurance  system.  This  change must  be
predicated  on  the  emergence of a well-regulated  insurance  industry,  which  is also in
process
II.  THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  OF PENSION REFORM
The new  system has challenged the  administrative  capacity and imagination  of
the  Kazakhstan  government  to  create  a  sustainable  pension  industry  and  requisite
regulatory  organs.  Several new institutions  play  a key  role in the functioning  of the
system.  These include  NSAFs  (private  pension  funds), asset management  companies
(AMCs), custodian  banks,  and  the state  accumulation  fund  (SAF).  In  addition,  new
regulatory  responsibilities  have led to  a three-tier  regulatory  structure  (see below) to
ensure that  the  funds and  AMCs  provide  a transparent  investment  process based on
business practices that  are not  tainted  with  corruption,  Mafia control,  or  otherwise
18 The base enumerate was developed as a standard  measure upon  which  to base benefit payments
replacing the use of the average wage prior  to the development  of a poverty line.  The base
enumerate is currently  725 tenge. In US dollar  terms these benefits range from or US$15.24 to
US$30.48.
9  Inflation  forecast for 2001 for the year on average is 6.9% (year-end is 5.5%), so base numerator  for
2001 (according to the draft 2001 Budget Law) is 775.
20 For  example, workers  earning the average wage of 12,686  tenge monthly  would  receive only 2.900
tenge for a totally  disabling condition,  that is, 23 percent  of their pre-disablement  earnings.
17questionable activities.  As a result of the pension reform, the regulation of financial
institutions has been strengthened, reducing  the scope for fraud and abuse. The NBK
is one  of  the  most  credible institutions  in  Kazakhstan and  many of  the  pension
regulators have benefited  from initial experience  at the NBK.
Since 1998, a new sector has blossomed  with the establishment of NSAFs and
AMCs.  As of October 1, 2000,  total pension  assets  had grown to 97.2  billion tenge (or
US$681.9  million) in less than 3 years. Within the pension system, 59 percent of all
assets are in NSAF accounts. The NSAF share has gradually expanded as the private-
sector  funds  have  developed over  time  and  individual contributors,  and  their
employers, have shown preference for the  private sector encouraged, perhaps, by
statements by the President in favor of NSAF investments.
In  terms  of  structure,  each NSAF must hire  one  AMC  while each  asset
management company can manage assets for multiple funds.  While the NSAF may
direct the overall allocation of assets, the fund's AMC is in charge of making day-to-
day transaction decisions.  Each fund keeps the accumulated  assets of fund contributors
exclusively with one authorized bank custodian that accounts for and reports on all
investment transactions, portfolio allocation and investment returns.  The custodian
bank often acts as the broker for the transactions. The basic three-tier structure was
instituted to provide for a clear separation of accounts and responsibilities so that a
system of checks and balances  could thwart any fraud  and abuse.
A.  The Pension Funds
Each employee and self-employed  worker can become a member of either the
SAF or  a NSAF.  The SAF was offered as an alternative to  private-sector  funds. In
Kazakhstan,  there  has  been  mistrust  of  both  state  and  private-sector financial
institutions,  after problems arose with  initial privatization funds and, particularly,
pyramid schemes in  which individual investors lost their  money  and shares were
purchased under duress or through fraud at undervalued  prices for the benefit of a few.
18Further,  examples of investment fund collapses, such as the 3M fund in Russia, are well
known  in Kazakhstan.  Thus, the SAF was started so employees wary  of NSAFs  could
select a fund  in which  they  had  greater trust.  Based on the original  concept  of the
Kazakhstan  pension  reform, the  SAF was to become a residual fund,  possibly focused
on the  older generation  of contributors,  with  the vast majority  of workers  selecting
private  funds  because  of  their  greater  latitude  for  portfolio  diversification,  and,
presumably,  higher rates of return.
1.  Non-State  Accumulation  Funds
NSAFs  are established as private,  closed-end, joint-stock  companies  and can be
managed as funds open to  all contributors  or as closed corporate  funds only  available
to  company  employees.  To  date,  only  one  fund,  Kazakhmys,  is  a  close  fund.  A
minimum  charter  capital of 55 million tenge (US$385,735) was originally required  for
open  funds  and  10 million  tenge  (US$70,134) for  closed funds.  In  1999, minimum
capital requirements  were  increased to  90 million tenge (US$631,202) for  open  funds
and 20 million tenge (US$140,267) for corporate funds. 2" While NSAF charter  capital is
legally separate from contributor  accounts, it is not  intended to serve as a repository  to
make up  for poor  investment  performance.  This  is left to  the AMCs.  Nonetheless,
the  authorized  use of the  charter  capital  needs to  be  revisited  with  a more  precise
definition  distinguishing  charter  capital from  operating  capital and reserves.  Further,
conditions  related  to  employer  liability  for  fund  losses should  be  reconsidered  if
corporate  funds are to  be encouraged.  Currently,  employer  liability  is unlimited  for
fund losses and this lack of separation limits employer interest in establishing corporate
funds.
The  primary  functions  of the  NSAFs  include  the  collection  of contributions
and  administration  of  contributor  accounts.  These  responsibilities  encompass
2i  The  dollar  value  figures  are  provided  at a current  exchange  rate  of approximately  143  tenge  per dollar.
Of course,  when  these  limits  were  set,  the exchange  rate  was  approximately  70  tenge  per dollar.
19transferring  contributions  to  AMCs,  distributing  investment  income  across
contributor  accounts,  and  calculating and  paying  pensions.  In  addition,  the  NASF
provides  contributors  information  about the total  value of their  accounts, unit  values,
and  the  rate  of  return  to  investments.  Further,  NSAFs  are  responsible  for  setting
general investment guidelines for affiliated AMCs.
Legal entities and/or  individuals of the Republic  of Kazakhstan  can be founders
and shareholders of corporate  pension  funds  and open  pension  funds.  Thus,  pension
funds can be started  by local organizations  or  by international  firms  with  registration
in  Kazakhstan,  although  currently  only  ABN-AMRO  is  in  the  pension  market.
Citizens  passing a qualification  test  can be  fund  managers.  Pension  funds  have the
right to  receive commissions  and, for reasons of transparency,  are obliged to  contract
with  one and  only  one  AMC.  The contract  defines the  distribution  of commissions
between the NSAF  and the AMC  for the  management  of fund  assets, the method  of
transferring  funds for benefit payments,  and includes the  rules of the contract  on trust
property  management.
Fourteen  non-state  accumulation  funds  were  licensed  as  of  October  2000
(Table 4).  This represented  an increase of three  compared  to  1999. As of October  1,
2000, the Narodny  Bank Pension  Fund  controlled  the largest portion  of NSAF  assets
at 32 percent.  But this  was a decrease from  its  position  in  1998, when  the  Narodny
Bank Pension Fund controlled  half of all private  fund assets.  Both Ular  and Umit  held
13 percent  of  all private  pension  assets. The  eight  largest  funds  accounted  for  88
percent of all private fund assets, a reduction  in concentration  compared  to  1998 when
6 of the  11 (at that  time) private  funds accounting for  94 percent  of total  private  fund
assets. This shift may indicate greater competition.
20Table  4:  Non-State  Accumulation  Funds
Pension Fund  Contributors  Net pension assets
1 Narodny  Pension  Fund  96,697  1,452,996.685
2 CaspiMunaiGas  Pension  Fund  41,533  1,639,669.687
3 Nefte-Gas-Dem  Pension  Fund  53,582  1,909,010.097
4 ABN AMRO  Pension Fund  25,266  3,442,657.616
5 Ular Pension  Fund  238,474  7,586,884.832
6 Kazakhmys  Pension  Fund  73,327  3,802,816.513
7 Narodny  Bank Pension  Fund  563,089  18.215,151.073
8 Umit Pension  Fund  271,737  7,426,625.650
9 Kazakhstan  Pension  Fund  46,010  2,222,825.276
10  Kurmet  Pension  Fund  90,257  2,266,485.145
11  Valyut Tranzit  Pension  Fund  80,273  1,266,849.225
12 Kunaev's  Pension  Fund  24,744  334,321.706
13 Senim  Pension  Fund  89,353  4,521,364.539
14 Korgau  Pension  Fund  20,471  378,654.425
SUBTOTAL  Private Sector  1,714,813  56.466,312.469
Source: National  Securities Commission/Comrnittee  for the Regulation
of Pension  Funds.
The current  structure  of private funds is not that different from other countries.
For  example,  in  Argentina,  Chile  and  Mexico,  the  top  five  pension  funds  hold  about
three-quarters  of  all assets.  Similarly,  in  Colombia,  Peru  and  Hungary,  the  largest
three  cover 60-75 percent  of total  members.  In Hungary,  the top  five hold 71 percent
of all assets. 22 But  none  of these  countries  has an equivalent  to the  SAF.  Currently,
the  SAF holds  42 percent  of all pension  assets, increasing  concentration  substantially
towards  state-owned  sources.  In  other  countries,  the  issue  has  been  whether  the
concentration  is a result of  market  forces or  regulation.  Only,  when  the SAF share
represents consumer choice, may this question be asked of Kazakhstan as well.
A number  of observers have suggested that ultimately  only five or six non-state
funds will remain  in operation.  This is likely, given that significant economies of scale
that  are observed in  pension  plan operations,  and may have started to transpire.3 In
September  2000, the  Trade  Unions  Federation  Pension  Fund  merged  with the  Umit
22 See  Srinivas,  Whitehouse, and Yermo (2000).
21Pension  Fund.  As  of  August  2000,  the  CaspiMunaiGas  Pension  Fund  has  been
undergoing  reorganization,  prior  to  its merger with  the  ABN-AMRO  Pension  Fund.
The  merger  is  expected  to  be  official  by  the  end  of  2000.  This  will  bring  the
membership  of the ABN-AMRO  fund to almost 67,000 contributors.
One  of the factors that may ultimately  narrow the market  is the fee structure  of
the  pension  system, which  allows a relatively narrow  margin  for profit.  In  fact, for
the first  few years pension  funds expect to face losses until  their  contributor  and  asset
bases build up.  It is likely that these recent mergers resulted from the increase in own-
capital requirements  that were to become effective on August 1, 2000.
Fee Structure.  The fee structure  for the pension  funds is fixed at no  more than
one percent  of contributions  and no more than ten percent  of investment  income.  The
architects  of the system  hoped to  avoid some of the excessive costs generated in other
privatized  systems resulting  from  churning  of accounts due  to  aggressive marketing.
Such  churning  has characterized  the  funded  system  in  Chile  at  the  expense  of  the
return  to  affiliates.  For  this reason, the  drafters of the Kazakhstan  legislation decided
to  institute  a maximum  fee structure.  These fees may be divided between the  NSAFs
and the AMC.  The AMC  share  is set at a maximum  of 0.15 percent  of contributions
and  five percent  of  investment  income.  Restricting  charges is a  relativelv  unusual
approach.  Whitehouse  (2000) indicates that  only  four countries,  Kazakhstan,  Poland,
Sweden, and the United  Kingdom  have restricted the level of fees.  The risk with  this
strategy is that  if fees are too low, providers  will not  be able to recover costs, even after
start-up costs have been amortized.
Considerable  discussion has taken place with  regards to the adequacy of the fee
structure  in  terms of fund  profitability.  Pension  fund  representatives  have indicated
that  100,000 to  150,000 contributors  are needed to  break even.  The total  number  of
23  Already, the Zhardem pension fund was reorganized  and merged with the Kunaev Pension
Fund. When Zhardem's temporarv license  has expired,  the Committee issued  no new license
to it.
22contributors in the private funds was 1.7 million as of October 1, 2000, a considerable
increase over the 600,000  private fund contributors at the end of 1998. At that time
only  the  Narodny Bank Pension Fund had  reached the  100,000-contributor  mark.
Currently,  Ular  and Umit each have over 200,000 contributors as well.  And four
other funds have over 80,000  contributors.  As the share of the SAF falls, more funds
should reach the 100,000-contributors  mark.
Ownership.  Initially, the ownership of the fund assets  was unclear.  As there is
no trust law in Kazakhstan, personal pension accounts  were not clearly the property of
the contributor.  This issue was subsequently clarified in amendments to the Pension
Law. The law now states that pension assets are property rights and may not be used
for debts of the contributor, the pension  fund, the AMC, or the custodian bank in case
of liquidation or bankruptcy.  Assets in individual accounts may only be invested in
financial  instruments  (according to  regulation), transferred  between  funds,  and
returned to contributions (as pensions or to  correct transfer errors).  These changes
ought  to  significantly improve  the  security  of  pension  accounts  for  current
contributors.
2.  Asset Management  Companies
AMCs are  legal entities created as closed-end joint  stock companies.  The
minimum  charter capital is 80 million tenge (US$561,089). Any  citizen can be a
manager of a company upon certification. The AMC has the right to sign contracts
with  one  or  more  NSAFs.  The  company's equity  must,  however,  increase in
proportion to the assets  under management. As of July 1, 2000,  the authorized capital
stock of AMCs was raised from a nominal 80,000  tenge to  150,000  tenge (US$561  to
US$1,052). Seven  private AMCs were licensed  by October 1, 2000, an increase  of three
over  1998 (Table 5).  According to the National Securities Commission (NSC), no
change in the number of licensed  AMCs is expected. One of the original AMCs had its
license suspended by the NSC following an inspection. The assets of that AMC were
transferred to other asset managers..
23At  this  point,  there  are close ties  between  a  number  of  NSAFs  and  AMCs
through  interlocking  founders.  While this  is not  a priori  a cause for concern,  initially
the NSAFs  and the AMCs were intended  to  be independent  of one another.  Prior  to
the passage of the Pension  Reform Law, the question  was raised whether  there  should
be separate  NSAFs  and  AMCs  or  whether  the  AMC  function  should  be  combined
with  the pension fund  as is generally done  in  Latin  America.  This  continues  to  be a
topic for discussion.
Pension fund contributors  are guaranteed  a rate of return  that  must  be not  less
than  the  lesser of two  indexes.  These  indexes  are (i) 50 percent  of the  average real
returns of all asset management companies or  (ii) the index of average real returns  of all
asset management  companies  less two  percent.  These prudential  norms  are specified
by  regulation  and  approved  by  governmental  decree.  The  procedure  for  calculating
the index  of average real  returns  is provided  in  the  decree.  The NSC  publishes  the
index for the previous month  not later than the  15th  of the following month.  If returns
for  any  AMC  are  less than  the  minimum,  deficiencies  are  to  be  covered  from  (1)
additional  reserve capital;  (2) principal  reserve  capital,  or,  as a last  resort  3)  AMC
equity.  To date, there has been no AMC  that has fallen below these guidelines.
24Table 5:  Asset Management Companies
Charter
Net  pension  assets
Pension  Fund  Assets  Under  Capital  of  Own Capital  *
Asset  Management  Company  Management  AMC  of AMC
I  ABN  AMRO  Narodny  Pension  Fund  80.000.000  200.875.177  8.444.334.085
ASSET  MANAGEMENTCaspiMunaiGas  Pension  Fund
Nefte-Gas-Dem  Pension  Fund
ABN  AMRO  Pension  Fund
2  ZHETYSU  Ular  Pension  Fund  152.000.000  245.910.670  11,389.701.345
Kazakhmys  Pension  Fund
3  NARODNY  BANK  Narodny  Bank  Pension  Fund  180,100.000  250,121.671  18.215.151.073
4  AK  NIET  Umit  Pension  Fund  150.000.000  149,389.358  7.426.625.650
5  BTA  ASSET
MANAGEMENT  Kazakhstan  Pension  Fund  80,000.000  253,299.322  4.489,310.421
Kurmet  Pension  Fund
6  AKTIV-INVEST  Valyut  Tranzit  Pension Fund  110,000.000  123.706.600  1,601.170.931
Kunaev's  Pension  Fund
7  BESTINVEST  Senim  Pension  Fund  80,000.000  101.152.040  4,900.018.964
Korgau  Pension  Fund
Source: National Securities  Commission
The non-state AMCs  acted quickly to  diversify their  portfolios  and by the  end
of  1998,  had  started  purchasing  Kazakhstan  Eurobond  issues.  Investments  in
Eurobonds  have continued,  making it the most widely held investment for all the non-
state pension  funds, accounting for all but  1 percent  of long-term Ministry  of Finance
issues (Chart  2).  The  most  recent  7-year Eurobond  issue offered a  coupon  rate  of
11.125 percent,  which  appears to be competitive.  While this  latter was a special issue,
in early July  2000, the KSE plans to offer Eurobonds  for sale for the domestic market.
The expansion of investment  options  is one of the greatest challenges for future of the
reform  (see Section IV.A.2). Currently,  all but  eight percent of pension fund assets are
in some type of government  paper.






E0MoF -L:ongTermGovemment-ShortTerm  cNon-GovtSecurities  A  Bank Deposits
Source:  National  Securities  Commission
The  AMCs  initially  have  provided  (estimated)  high  rates  of return  from  their
investments  as National  Bank  notes  and  T-Bills  were  offering  interest  rates  of  23-25
percent  towards  the  end  of  1998.  Pension  system  real  rates  of  return  were  an
estimated  13 percent  in  1998  and  45  percent  in  1999,  the  year  of  the  devaluation. 2 4
Monthly  real  returns  for  the  first  half  of  2000  have  been  lower,  however,  averaging
between  5-10 percent.2 5 One  reason  for  the  success  of the  pension  fund  investments  is
that  they  have  been  primarily  in  foreign  currency  denominated  investments  lChart  3).
In the  long  run,  such  an investment  strategy  does not  do  much  for  the  development  of
the  local  economy  nor  is the  best  way  to diversify  internationally.
24  These figures  are based  on calculations  made  by the USAID Pension  Project based on real investment
returns.  See below.
25 These  figures  are  based  on figures  calculated  for  Kazakhstan  Economy  Trends  based  on  NBK  figures.
26Chart 3:  Kazakhstan:  Distribution of NSAF Assets  by
National and Foreign Currency  Denomination,
October 1, 2000
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While rates of return  surely have been high, the calculation methodology  still is
in  transition.  The  calculation  of the  unit  values  of contributor  shares  was  set  by
regulation,  but a number  other key issues related to  of the measurement  process funds
have not  been settled.  Unit values are supposed to be calculated daily for each pension
fund.  Individual  accounts  are valued  on  the  basis of the  unit  value  calculations  by
multiplying  the initial contribution  by the unit value calculated for the fund.  But the
current  calculation method  for unit values has been criticized as exerting  a downward
bias on the returns of quickly expanding pension  funds with  contributor  transfers  from
the SAF.  In addition, fixed-interest instruments  have been valued at cost rather  than at
market  or  a  reference market  rate  (based  on  the  valuation  of  infrequently  traded
securities  on  ones  with  similar  term  conditions,  systems  of  indexation,  nominal
coupon  interest rates, and other  warranties  of a similar  nature).  Consequently,  figures
for  the  portfolio  distribution  of  specific  funds  and  their  rates  of  return  must  be
regarded with  skepticism until  these issues are resolved.  Hopefully,  this  will happen
by the end of 2000.
273.  Custodian Banks
Custodian  banks  ought  to  be  the  lynchpins  of the  reformed  pension  system
ensuring that  neither the NASFs  nor the AMCs can make felonious use of the assets in
the  accounts  of  plan contributors.  The  NBK  had  10 custodian  banks  licensed  (not
including the NBK for the SAF) as of October  2000; but only five banks were actually
acting as custodians (Table 6).  One  custodian, the Caspian Bank, was dropped after the
merger of the Trade Union  Pension Fund with  Umit.  Others  banks with licenses have
not yet been called upon  by the NSAFs  to be custodians. 26
Table  6:  Custodian  Banks,  October  1, 2000
Custodian  Bank  Pension  Fund  Net pension assets *
I Narodny Bank  Narodny Pension Fund  1,452.996.685
CaspiMunaiGas Pension Fund  1.639,669.687
Nefte-Gas-Dem Pension Fund  1.909,010.097
ABN AMRO Pension Fund  3.442.657.616
Ular Pension Fund  7,586,884.832
Kazakhmys Pension Fund  3.802.816.513
Umit Pension Fund  7A26,625.650
27,260.661.080
2 Almaty Merchant Bank Narodny Bank Pension Fund  18.215.151.073
Kunaev's Pension Fund  334,321.706
Korgau Pension Fund  378,654.425
18,928,127.204
3 Kazcommerebank  Kazakhstan Pension Fund  2,222,825.276
4 Temirbank  Kurmet Pension Fund  2,266,485.145
Valyut Tranzit Pension Fund  1.266.849.225
3,533,334.3.0
5 Eurasian Bank  Senim Pension Fund  4,521,364.539
Source:  National  Securities Commission
The  Narodny  Bank  has  the  lions  share  of  private  fund  assets, just  over  48
percent.  Almaty  Merchant  Bank currently  holds another  third.  Thus, the tw-o largest
custodian banks hold 82 percent  of all assets. Each Bank is considered to be financially
26 The inactive custodian  banks are ABN-Amro,  Bank Credit Senter, and HSBC Bank of Kazakhstan,  in
addition to the Caspian Bank.
28stable.  Nonetheless interlocking financial interests between the NSAFs, the  AMCs
and the custodian banks have raised questions about the potential for abuse.
If  the  custodian bank also is  closely linked to  the  other  two  entities, the
potential  for conflict of  interest multiplies with  the possibility of  party-in-interest
investments and non-competitive practices that would benefit the founders and not
maximize returns for the plan contributors.  Given the rudimentary development of
the private-capital market, however, party-in-interest  investments were initially lesser
concern.  Initial asset holdings were not sufficient to provide substantial deposits to
banks that  could subsequently be used to  provide credit to  founders'  enterprises.
Nonetheless,  such connections have now  become more  critical as pension  assets
represent a substantial proportion of national savings. 27 Consequently, the custodian
bank must be trusted to review stock and bond purchases  made on behalf of the fund
by the AMC with due diligence. Improvements in corporate governance to mitigate
these risks will be of great importance.
4.  The State Accumulation Pension Fund.
The Government of Kazakhstan is the founder of the SAF, which is established
as a closed-end  joint stock company. The Ministry of Finance provided the SAF initial
capital equal to  10 million tenge.  The SAF has a board of directors that  consists
exclusively of representatives  from government ministries and from the NBK. 28 The
safety of worker contributions is guaranteed  directly by Government. The head of the
SAF responsible for day-to-day  management is appointed directly by the Minister of
Labor.  Contributors  are free to  select the  SAF as their  pension fund  of choice.
Contributions  also flow to  the  SAF from contributors who have not  designated a
27 In only three  years,  pension  assets  have  grown  to equal  one-third  of the  value  of banking  deposits  of
residents  of Kazakhstan.
28 These  are  the Minister  of Labor  and  Social  Protection,  a vice-minister  of the MLSP,  a vice-minister  of
the Ministry  of Finance,  a vice-minister  of the Ministry  of Revenues,  and a deputy  governor  of the
NBK. The  respective  Ministers  (Governor)  decides  who  will  be the representative  at the vice
ministerial  level.
29particular NSAF.  The MOLSP and the MOF  are jointly  responsible for approving the
supervising  committee.  The NBK  originally  provided  asset management  services for
the SAF.  The NBK continues to serve as the custodian  bank.
The  percentage  share  of SAF  holdings  has  decreased  since inception.  As  of
January  1,  1999,  the  NSC  reported  total  assets  in  pension  accumulation  funds
amounting  to 23.6 billion tenge.  At that time,  just over 76 percent  of total  assets were
invested in the SAF.  The shift toward  the NSAFs  continued  so that by October  2000,
the  SAF held only  42 percent  of assets, a decline of  10 percentage  points  since May
2000. It is anticipated that  the  SAF will be privatized,  although  the manner  in  which
this  will take place has not  yet been determined.  It  appears likely,  however,  that  the
state will keep a significant state in the ownership  as an initial measure.
Shifts  in  contributions.  The  stream  of  contributions  has  shifted  substantially
from  the SAF to  the NSAF,  suggesting that  the  allocation  of assets between  the  SAF
and private AMCs will begin to favor the NSAFs.  In 1999, the share of contributions
directed towards the SAF decreased from  60.5 percent  of contributions  to 47.5 percent,
averaging 56 percent over the year . As of October  5, 2000, the share  of contributions
directed towards  the NSAFs  for the year averaged 36 percent,  with  further  declines in
recent months.  If this trend  continues, the  SAF share could  be reduced to  one-third
of total contributions  by the end of the year.
Millions  of  tenge  have  been  transferred  from  the  SAF  to  the  NSAFs  for
contributors  who had initially not selected a fund.  Since the SAF was the default fund,
monies were automatically  credited to  it during  the first  months  of the reform  when
employee  decisions had  not  all  been  formalized  and  the  NSAFs  had  not  all  been
established.  But these transfers  virtually  came to  a standstill  during  the  latter  part of
1999,  as  government  instituted  new  rules  for  transfer  procedures  that  placed
considerable  administrative  burdens  on  contributors.  This  problem  was  resolved,
however,  by  means of an opinion  from  the  General  Prosecutor's  Office  so that  the
speedy transfer of assets to the NSAFs has resumed.
30In 2000, up to  October  4th,  transfers  to  NSAFs  through  the  SPPC followed a
similar  pattern  to  the  distribution  of assets with  the  Narodny  Bank  Pension  Fund
receiving 33 percent  of contributions  followed  by  Ular  at 13 percent  and Umit  at 12
percent  (Chart  4).  This  may  indicate  future  trends  to  follow  if  both  initial
contributions  and transfers from the NSAF are following similar patterns.
Chart  4:  Percentage Share of Contributions  among
NSAFs, 2000
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There are still 1.8 million contributors  to the SAF (by choice or by default), or
53.1 percent  of all  contributors,  indicating  that,  on  average,  SAF  contributions  are
lower  than  NSAF  contributions.  This  suggests that  contributors  to  the  SAF  have
lower  incomes and/or  include  more  individuals  with  income  stemming  in  large part
from  the informal  sector.  Some of these individuals  could consider their  assets to  be
safer with  the state,  while  others  could just  have less interest  in  participating  in the
system than do employees with  a greater stake in the formal sector.  The challenge that
government  and the  NSAF  face is to  encourage  such  workers,  whose  contributions
31have come to  the  SAF by default, to take an active role in planning for their  own
retirement years.
The SAF manages  and maintains its own database, although this function was
originally under  the  State Pension Payment Center  (SPPC).z 9 In  taking over the
database, the  SAF  identified  numerous  problems  with  the  way  in  which  the
information was held by the SPPC.  The SAF is currently working to improve the
quality of the data and the accuracy of the information it controls.  In both cases, an
outside computer firm has been providing support based on the specifications  provided
by the government entities.
B.  Regulatory and Administrative Structures
Three Government entities are responsible  for regulating of the pension system:
(1) the  NSC supervising the  asset management companies; (2) Committee for the
Regulation of Pension Funds 30 supervising  the pension funds (reporting to the MLSP);
and (3) the NBK supervising the custodian banks.  The SPPC, also reporting to  the
MOLSP, is the key administrative  institution for the residual PAYGO pension system
and moderates the transfer of contributions to the pension funds.  Unlike Chile and
other  Latin  American  countries,  Kazakhstan  divided  regulatory  duties  among
government organizations. This was decided in part, because a unified agency would
have been difficult  to establish  in a country with limited regulatory experience,  and, in
part, to place specific functions under the aegis of the organization with the greatest
related experience.
29 The SPPC  is responsible  for PAYGO  pension  payments  and the allocation  of connributions
to the SAF  and the NSAFs. It is  discussed  in detail  in the next  section.
The Committee  was formerly  the National  Pension  Agency  (NPA). It was changed  to a
Committee  to more accurately  reflect  the fact that it is an office  within the Ministry  of
Labor  and Social  Protection  and not an independent  agency.
321.  Committee  for the Regulation  of Pension  Funds.
The  Committee  is responsible  for:  (1) licensing  and  supervising  NSAFs;  (2)
approving  pension  contract  practices;  (3) regulating  benefit  payments,  (4) ensuring
confidentiality  of  individual  pension  accounts,  (5) safeguarding  inter-fund  account
transfers;  and  (6) regulating the  operation,  accounting,  reorganization,  merger  and
liquidation  of  funds.  It  is  also  responsible  for  control  and  supervision  of  SAF
activities.  The  Committee  is part  of the  Ministry  of  Labor  and  Social Protection,
reporting  directly  to  the  Minister.  As  such, it  carries  out  ministerial  policies with
regard to pension  regulation.  The organization  is relatively  small, although  growing,
with  current  staffing up to  30 personnel.
The Committee  has increased its viability  as a pension  fund  regulatory  agency,
issuing  and  revising regulations  for  the  operation  of  pension  funds,  and  inspecting
licensed pension funds, including the SAF.  After the first year of operation,  eight non-
state accumulation funds received general licenses for an unlimited  time,  in place of the
initial  temporary  licenses.  New  regulations  have  been  issued  on  accounting  and
reporting  procedures,  independent  external auditing,  the  reorganization-liquidation  of
pension funds, and minimum capital requirements.
The Committee  increased its visibility as a regulator  by suspending the general
license of Korgau pension  fund for a period  of three  months  when  it was discovered
that  one  of  the  founders  owed  more  than  25  percent  of  the  Fund's  shares.  The
Committee  also  suspended  the  general  license  of  the  Narodny  Pension  Fund  (as
distinct  from  the Narodny  [Halyk] Bank Pension  Fund) because of irregularities  in its
financial reports.  While such scrutiny  is desirable, these findings also indicate that the
original licensing procedures were defective.
332.  National  Securities Commission
The  NSC  is responsible  for  (1) licensing  and supervising  AMCs;  (2) licensing
and  supervising  custodian  banks  (with  the  NBK);  and  (3) regulating  the  investment
activity of NSAFs.  The NSC  has established  a separate pension  unit for this purpose.
Relatively  early  in  the  reform,  the  NSC  suspended  the  license of one  AMC  (which
undoubtedly  should  not  have  been  licensed  in  the  first  place)  after  an  inspection
showed unsatisfactory  accounting  practices.  Generally  speaking, the  NSC  has been
the most effective of the pension  system regulators.
3.  National  Bank  of Kazakhstan
The NBK is responsible for licensing and  regulating the custodian banks, which
safeguard the  assets of the  NSAFs.  The  NBK  has assigned the  Banking  Supervision
Department  critical responsibilities for pension  oversight.  The Department  has gained
a fine reputation  for managing and modernizing  the current  banking  system.  To date,
the  actions of the  NBK  as custodial  regulator  appear to  be  well received.  The NBK
continues  to maintain  daily records of pension  fund transactions  along with the NSC.
While,  the  NBK  used to  have a separate  unit  acting  as asset manager  for  the
SAF, this  function  was taken  out  of the NBK  and placed with  the  SAF (including the
staff managing the portfolio).  This  reduced the potential  for conflict of interest,  as the
NBK was both  responsible for asset management  and for monetary  policy.  The NBK
is also the  custodian  bank  for  the  SAF.  This  is an  area where  a future  conflict  of
interest  could be possible should  the NBK  not  be  independent  of Government.  The
NBK as custodian bank  should flag investments  that  are inappropriate  even if issued by
the Ministry  of Finance.  The  current  Governor  of the  NBK  has been quoted  in the
press saying that  he would  not  have accepted his position  had such independence  as a
condition  of his acceptance. 31 . Yet, the  role of the NBK  and of the custodian  banks
31 Euromoney (2000)
34needs  to be reconsidered  as the custodian banks currently provide other services  for the
AMCs.
4.  The State Pension Payment Center
The SPPC has had an unenviable and checkered history, partly due to external
events such as the Russian crisis, and partly due to management  problems  and a lack of
clearly  stated objectives. The current role of the SPPC is threefold: (1)  to calculate  and
pay PAYGO pensions; (2) to  ensure that the working population participates in the
system through  the  issuance  of  identification numbers;  and  (3) to  ensure that
contributions  are  accurately  assigned  to the fund chosen by the contributor.
The role of the SPPC has been one of constant change since its inception. For
example, initially the SPPC was responsible for maintaining the SAF database. Now,
this  function  is  performed  by  the  SAF  itself.  Both  payroll  taxes  and  funded
contributions  were originally  collected by the SPPC.  Now, payroll tax-collection  and
enforcement are the responsibility of the state revenue collection service.  The SPPC
continues to receive  the 10-percent  contributions for the funded system, however, and
directs  them accordingly.
Pension payment is one of the basic functions of the SPPC. Initially,  the SPPC
caught up  on PAYGO  pension payment arrears at end-November 1998.32  Pension
arrears again appeared during the first quarter of 1999  when the Government revenues
started to  erode following the Russian crisis and the sharp downturn in commodity
32 The World  Bank  provided  a US$300  million  Loan  to the Government  of Kazakhstan  in July
1998  to support the pension  reform. Timely  payment of pensions  is a condition  for the
release  of each  tranche of the Pension Reform  Adjustment  Loan (PRAL)  and has been a
government  priority.
35prices.  This  second wave of pension  arrears was paid up after the Second Tranche  of
the World Bank's Pension Reform Adjustment Loan (PRAL) was disbursed.`
The SPPC  is responsible for issuing Social Individual  Codes (SICs) to ensure to
all persons  of working  age have a unique identifier  for their  funded pension  accounts.
Because  the  issuance  of  these  numbers  was  initially  hampered  by  delays  in  the
installation  of the  central  and  regional  computer  systems,  the  World  Bank  relaxed
initial PRAL 34 conditionality  for SIC assignment to  10 percent  of persons identified  as
working  in the formal  sector.  Subsequently, 3.2-million SICs were issued to workers
in the formal sector.  However,  many mistakes in SIC assignment were also made.
The efficient transfer of contributions  by employers  on behalf of emplDyees and
the  self-employed  is  necessary  to  build  public  confidence  in  the  system  and  to
maximize  the  returns  contributors  receive on  their  contributions.  The  SPPC  has
improved  the  time  taken  to  record  and transmit  contributions  to  the  accumulation
funds.  When there are no substantial errors, the-SPPC transmits  all payments  received
before mid-afternoon  on the day of receipt and other payments within  one day.  These
improvements  have resulted in  significantly fewer funds held in transit  by the SPPC.
However,  because the  SPPC returns  all errors  to the  enterprise  rather  than  initiating
corrective  measures,  contribution  transmission  to  the  accumulation  funds  is  still
delayed.
III.  THE FuTnTRE  OF THE PENSION REFORM
Although  the  new  pension  system officially began on January  1, 1998, many
steps  are  needed  to  complete  the  reform,  as  policies,  institutions,  and  regulatory
capacities  are developed.  Pension  reform  is a process,  not  an event,  and  the  actual
33 A  second tranche  waiver was granted to  excuse the  accumulation of  arrears on  the
knowledge that  the  second tranche  disbursement was necessary to  make  the  pension
payments.
3  See Section III.B for a discussion  of the history behind the decision of the World Bank to
support the Kazakhstan  pension reform.
36implementation  and  improvement  of the  reform  will  continue  for  years.  This  has
certainly been the case in Latin American countries that have instituted  funded pension
systems.
A.  Steps to Ensure  Sustainability
The  World  Bank  supported  Kazakhstan's  ambitious  approach  to  pension
reform  realizing  the  considerable  risks  involved.  These  risks  are  economic  and
political.  At  this  point,  a second tranche  of the  PRAL  has  been disbursed,  and the
third  tranche  has been requested for  later  in  2000, as Government  insists  it will  be
ready to satisfy all Loan Agreement conditions  by that time.
While  much  progress  has  been  made,  including  an  expanding  network  of
NSAFs  and AMCs, greater progress is required.  Steps to ensure sustainability  must be
taken  in  four  areas: (1) the  structure  of  benefits;  (2) the  financial  structure;  (3) the
regulatory  structure;  and  (4)  the  administrative  structure.  Events  during  1999
(described  below)  have underlined  the  fragility  of the  reform.  Nonetheless,  if  the
authorities  remain committed  to  the reform  concept  and the implementation  process,
Kazakhstan  will  succeed in  introducing  a  radical  market  reform  in  a  transition
economy.
1.  The Benefit  Structure
Benefit design issues were  not  a major  consideration  for the  developers  of the
pension  reform.  To  date,  little  analysis has  been  conducted  to  assess the  level  of
benefits  that  future  pensioners  can  expect.  While  this  has  not  been  an  immediate
priority,  technical  assistance is  anticipated,  through  competitive  bidding  under  the
World  Bank's Pension Reform  Implementation  Loan (PRIL), to  assess future  benefit
issues. 35 Without  this assessment, and  subsequent  steps to  reconfigure  the  reform, the
35  The PRIL was funded  by the World Bank as a component the restructured Finance and Enterprise
Development  Project (FEDP)
37Kazakhstan authorities  may be  surprised to  find in  the  future  that  pensions are
insufficient  even for workers with average  earnings contributing over a full career. To
date,  analysis of  expected benefits for  different cohorts  of  retirees is  y  et  to  be
undertaken.  Certainly, pension adequacy for women and low-wage  earners will need
to be considered within the  overall context of the reform.  This analysis should be
conducted in conjunction with the development of the insurance industry to  ensure
that the provision of pensions  under the funded system is adequate.
In the absence of a viable insurance industry, the Pension Law did not indicate
how pensions are to  be provided but  left that  decision for the  future.  To  date,
contributions to  retirees and emigrants have been paid as lump-sum distributions.
Recent MLSP draft regulations on future funded-system  pensions have been premature
and unsophisticated;  and greater expertise needs to be developed  in this area if options
are to be developed which meet the  standards of best international practice.  Many
types of  pensions are  possible, ranging  from  lump-sum distributions, which  are
currently  offered, to  complex joint  and  survivor  annuities, which  offer lifetime
pensions  to both participant and spouse.
If  Government  eventually decides to  require pensions in  the  form  of  an
annuity, many questions will need to be answered.  For example, should the annuity
be paid over the life of the pensioner only, or over the life of the pensioner and his or
her spouse?  Should lump sum benefits never be allowed or allowed only for small
sums when an annuity  would be inconsequential?  Should exceptions be made for
lump-sum  distributions in cases  in which the contributor has a terminal disease?
Similarly,  behavioral  interactions  between  contribution  compliance  and
minimum pensions need to be explored.  In all pension systems,  individuals w  ill act in
their own best interest and plan for their  retirement on a least-cost  basis.  In other
words, if contributions are too high and benefits too low, some workers will figure out
how to  qualify for a minimum pension by  limiting their  contributions.  Another
minimum pension issue is related to the type of explicit or implicit inflation indexing
that accumulation fund pensions are expected to  provide.  If pensions are not  well
38indexed, pensioners may find that their payments gradually erode in real terms and
that they end up with the minimum pension.  For similar reasons, Government may
decide to restrict payments to annuities (rather than fixed-term  payments which draw
down fund assets after a certain number of years) to  ensure that pensioners do  not
qualify for the minimum pension after that time.
Kazakhstan still has time to  address these issues, if government officials take
them seriously. In an accumulation system, the financial  aspects  of annuity provision
are as complex and important as portfolio strategies. With the NBK taking the lead on
the  organization  of  the  insurance industry,  supported by  technical assistance by
USAID, pension products may be developed within a useful time span.  Similarly,
planning for the  transformation  of the  disability and survivors program into  one
founded on insurance principles has been started.
2.  The Financial Structure
Originally, the pension reform was to  develop capital markets in Kazakhstan
by  "tendering off  major  blocks of  shares to  attract  strategic investors and  then
gradually  selling  out  the  remaining  state  blocks  of  shares through  the  stock
exchange." 36 This was to be implemented,  in part, through the "issue  of novel financial
instruments, i.e. corporate and municipal bonds, mortgage instruments, and derivatives
that will allow investor portfolio diversification  and mobilization of financial  resources
to  new  segments  of  the  pension  system." 37 Perhaps  these  objectives were
overoptimistic.  Certainly,  they have been pursued less vigorously than  originally
anticipated.
Privatization.  In theory, NSAFs can invest in shares of Class A companies,
those  which  have  been  subject to  an  independent audit  based on  international
standards.  Shares of Kazakhstan companies were to  be made available  to  pension
36 Marchenko,  op.  cit.
37 Marchenko,  op.  cit.
39funds through the 'Blue Chip' privatization in which majority blocks of shares were
first to  be tendered to  strategic investors and then gradually sold through the  KSE.
Government was to  achieve  its multiple objectives  of privatization, securities market
development,  and pension reform by selling  its remaining shares  in large enterprises on
the KSE. This approach, to be implemented  gradually,  would have  taken intD account
budgetary needs for privatization revenues along with the pension funds' ability to
absorb equity shares, and was to provide the pension funds with the opportunity  to
acquire quality Kazakhstan  companies  in a competitive  manner.
These objectives were stalled from the start, as the  'Blue Chip' program was
delayed by the time the PRAL went to Board in July 1998. The delay was regarded as
temporary by many observers, however.  Further, it was even welcomed to a certain
extent  as  it  provided traders  on  the  KSE, which  was in  its  infancy, additional
experience  trading government bonds and short-term paper.  While the KSE was small,
it  had developed a  system for computerized trading  with  the  help of  substantial
USAID technical assistance. But trades were infrequent, not necessarily even on  a
daily basis, and the official market extremely thin.  Although the delay in the 'Blue
Chip' program was disappointing, the pension reform had just  started and many other
regulatory and administrative  concerns required more immediate attention.
Unfortunately, the pension reform was followed closely by the Asian Crisis,
the Russian meltdown, and the substantial  fall in commodity prices, which overturned
Government's carefully constructed macroeconomic  projections and made a shambles
of fiscal  and monetary policy. The Asian Crisis also prevented some strategic investors
from meeting their obligations. With the Russian crisis and precipitous declines in all
emerging market stock exchanges,  the Blue Chip program was further delayed. These
conditions stymied the development of the capital market, and, as a consequence,  the
possibility for the NSAFs to diversify their portfolios.
The 2000 budget envisaged privatization revenues of over US$400 million -
that is revenues from the reactivation of the 'Blue Chip' program.  During the first
40quarter of 2000, however, only  11 percent of that total  was raised.  Originally, the
schedule called for the privatization of 10 blue chip companies.  Subsequently, four
companies were  removed from  the  list  (Sokolov-Serbai Mining, Aluminium  of
Kazakhstan, Kazchrome, and  Kazakhmys).  Currently,  only  16.7 percent of state
shares  of Narodny Bank have been sold.  According to the Ministry of Finance, out of
the remaining 'Blue Chip' companies, some state shares of the Manystaumunaigas  old
company and Kazakhtelecom were scheduled for sale by the  end of the year.  The
Ministry of Finance also confirmed that  the budget was in  no  need of accelerated
privatization.  In other words, privatization is now regarded solely as a method for
macroeconomic  stabilization, and not as an end in and of itself.  Unless Government
considers it important to  develop the  private sector, pension funds will not  have
alternative investments.
Diversification. Another worrisome development is the reduction in the limits
for investments into deposit certificates and accounts of second level banks.  This
resolution was promulgated to prevent improper use of pension fund assets by means
of bank deposits. This represents an unnecessary  limitation of portfolio diversification,
however, as improper investments ought to  be investigated on  an individual basis
without reducing  the opportunity to design constructive  portfolio strategies.
This  raises a  more  general issue about  the  limits  set  on  investments, in
particular the requirement that 50 percent of investments must be held in Government
securities.  The degree of limitation on  investment opportunities for pension plans
developing and  transition  economies during  the  start-up  of  pension  reform  has
engendered  considerable  recent discussion. While there are a number of sound reasons
to limit investments,  too much limitation for too long is likely to dilute incentives  for
the maximization  of investment returns to the detriment of the contributor.
In Chile, banking deposits during the first 10 years of operation, from 1981-
1990,  amounted to 24 percent of total assets (Chart 5).  These figures fluctuated from
year to  year, as did the  others, to  take  into  account market  conditions.  While
41investments  in corporate  equities did not  start until  1985, bank  deposits and  mortgage
bonds  represented  important  investments  into  the  Chilean  economy.  These
investments  in the  banking  sector  resumed even after a significant reduction  in  bank
deposit  holdings  in  1983 when  Chile  experienced  a banking  crisis.  Investments  in
mortgage  bonds  have also been  an extremely  important  part  of the  Chilean  pension
portfolio.  A similar market  development  in Kazakhstan would be particularly  fruitful
as one  of the  constraints  to business development  and labor mobility  has been due to
rigidities in the property  market.
Chart 5:  Chile:  Pension  Fund Asset  Allocation
10 year  average  (1981-1990)
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In  Kazakhstan,  most  pension  investments  are  in  government  instruments.
Further,  most  pension  investments,  whether  government  or corporate,  are in foreign-
currency  denominated  securities,  reflecting  the  dollarization  of  the  Kazakhstan
economy.  In  the  longer  term,  it  is vital  that  Kazakhstan's  economy  and  financial
markets  develop sufficiently so that domestic  investments  are available and profitable.
This  can  only  take  place  effectively  after  state  ownership  is  reduced  through
privatization.  Further,  the  banking sector should  become a normal  source  of finance
for  domestic  business development.  Currently,  the  difficulties and  uncertainties  of
business  establishment  and  operation  appear  to  have discouraged the  banking  sector
from  basing  their  operations  on  normal  business loans.  Consequently,  foreign  and
42domestic investments in the internal Kazakhstan  economy outside of the energy sector
have not developed.
The banking system, in general, is still in the development stage despite the
high credibility of the NBK and good first tier banks that have been used as pension
fund custodians. As of July 2000,  there were 48 licensed  second  tier banks including 20
with  foreign  participation  and  12  foreign  banks.  During  2000, licenses were
withdrawn from five banks by the NBK as a result of licensing violations.  This is a
positive sign that  supervisory scrutiny  is being increased.  Apparently  increased
confidence in the banking system and a more vibrant economy led to an increase in
deposits to 287.4 billion tenge (US$1.7  billion), a gain of 46 percent since the start of
the year.  Further, there has been a shift from demand deposits towards time deposits,
also indicating increased confidence in the banking system.  But, before the banking
sector makes significant loans to  businesses,  the governance and regulatory structure
within  Kazakhstan will have to  be improved and the  returns from  investment in
business  will need  to outstrip foreign currency operations.
Progress is being made on the investment front, however slowly.  Several new
issues of local dollar-denominated  bonds and Eurobonds have been or are ready to be
issued. Issuers include KazakhOil, Temir Zholy (railroads),  Narodny Bank and some
smaller companies.  USAID projections suggest  that there could be $400 million or
more in corporate bonds in the market by the end of the year.  Estimates suggest that
up  to  25  percent  of  pension fund  portfolio  investments could  be  in  corporate
instruments by 2001.  This would be a higher percentage than in Chile at the same
stage  of development. Hopefully, these plans will proceed on target.
Valuation and Rates of Return.  In April 1999,  just after the devaluation of the
tenge following the Russian crisis, the Ministry of Finance offered pension funds the
opportunity  to purchase 5-year, 6.14-percent  dollar-denominated  government bonds.
These bonds were offered at the pre-devaluation  exchange rate of 88.3 tenge per US
dollar, rather than at the higher post-devaluation  rate.  The SAF swapped virtually all
43of its short-term  tenge-denominated  securities  for  these new  instruments,  Converting
Government's short-term  obligations into longer-term liabilities.  This both  helped
Government  financing and provided a false sense of security  to SAF contributors  who
may have thought  that  they  were  compensated  for the  devaluation.  Unfortunately,
this left the SAF with assets that  were illiquid  except at a sharp  discount  - which  the
SAF was not  willing to  provide.  Consequently  it  was not  possible  for  the  SAF  to
transfer  funds to  the NSAFs  promptly  when  contributors  selected another  fund.  A
recent  Eurobond  issue was  substituted  for  these  5-year  bonds  with  the  intent  of
furnishing the SAF with  more liquid assets. Even if these steps do provide  licquidity to
the SAF, the use of 5-year bonds by Government  to shore up macroeconomic  policy at
the expense of pensioners signals the need to remove the SAF from public control.
Other  valuation issues discussed earlier are being settled through  the efforts of a
committee  to  establish rules  for  the  valuation  of assets on  a market-to-market  basis.
These  new  procedures,  which  also affect calculated  rates  of  returns,  should  provide
contributors  a firmer  basis of comparisons  for  rates of return  achieved by the various
pension  funds.  It is anticipated that  market  valuation  will be in place by the end  of
the year.
An appropriate  and consistent structure  with  which  to  calculate rates of return
will also affect AMC performance  guarantees.  At this point,  private funds only  had to
ensure that their returns  were above those of the SAF.  This was not difficult given the
initial investment policies of the SAF, first in short term  paper and subsequently  in the
low  return  5-year bonds.  In fact, the dominance  of the  SAF effectively ensured  that
the  average return  for all pension  funds  would  closely track  the SAF  return.  While
this  problem  could have been mitigated  by eliminating  the  SAF from  the average, as
the  SAF's  market  share  declines,  the  explicit  valuation  of  assets and  provision  of
consistent  rules  for  computing  rates  of  return  becomes  an  even higher  priority  for
performance  guarantees.  Another  element  of this  process is the  development  of risk
rating services for the country,  an area that is also under  consideration  by the NSC.
44State Accumulation  Fund.  Because the SAF is not  required to  use a 'for profit'
AMC,  it  has  a  cost  advantage  over  the  NSAFs.  Further,  the  Government  has
subsidized the SAF in terms of office space and salaries and in a number of other ways.
Of course,  the  diversity  of investments  permitted  the  NSAFs  ought  to  offer higher
rates  of return  and,  consequently,  better  investments  for  contributors.  In the  near
term,  however,  with  limited  outlets  for  investments,  the  SAF has a cost  advantage.
One way to equalize this difference would  be to permit  the NSAFs to invest at least 10
to  20 percent  of fund  assets in  high  quality  international  equities.  With  the bulk  of
investments  currently  in  Government  securities,  the  possibility  to  invest in  equities
worldwide  would  open  up  much  greater  diversification  for  the  NSAFs  and  provide
higher rates of return  for contributors.  After more  companies  are privatized  and are
listed on the KSE, NSAFs will be in a position  reconfigure  their portfolios  to achieve a
desired balance of risk and return.
3.  The Regulatory  Structure
While  progress  has  been  made  in  improving  regulation,  further  steps  are
needed.  For  example,  from  the  onset,  Committee  and  the  NSC  reporting
requirements  have been considered  excessive, particularly  since their  ability  to  make
efficient  use  of  the  information  has  been  in  question.  As  a  transition  economy,
Kazakhstan had little experience with  regulation  outside the banking sector, and much
experience with  direct  state control.  Consequently,  the approach  to regulation  has all
too  frequently  been  bureaucratic,  with  innumerable  reporting  forms  required  for
licensing and supervision.  The  original  licensing  of NSAFs  and AMCs  was a paper
checking operation  without  scrutiny  of the underlying  trustworthiness  of the founding
organizations.  Similarly, during  this  learning  process, each of the regulatory  agencies
flooded  the NSAFs  and AMCs  with  paperwork  on  a weekly  basis, changing  forms
almost  as  often  and  creating  duplicative  reporting  requirements  in  more  than  one
instance.
45Consequently,  the  NSC  needs to  coordinate  with  the  Committee,  at the least,
in  issuing  instructions  for pension  fund  mergers and transfers  of pension  assets. The
establishment  of  a  permanent  working  committee  of  the  three  regulatory  agencies
would  be an initial step  in the coordination  of reporting  requirements  using common
standards  and  sharing  information.  In the  near future,  the development  of a unified
regulatory  structure,  initially  under  NSC  leadership and eventually  as an inclependent
agency, ought  to be a priority.
Both  USAID  and  the  World  Bank  have recommended  that  Kazakhstan  take
steps to  combine the regulatory  agencies into one entity,  initially under  the NSC,  since
the  primary  regulatory  issues are  financial.  Discussions  are  still  in  progress  as the
MLSP  has  argued  that  it  still  needs  to  be  involved  to  guarantee  protection  for
contributors.  The  guarantees  of  safety  required  for  pension  fund  contributors,
however,  are  similar  to  financial  safeguards  for  participants  in  mutual  fands  and
individual investors.
The experience with  the 5-year low-interest  bonds raises a serious concern that
the  new  funded  pension  system could continue  to  be used as an  arm of Government
fiscal and  monetary  policy,  rather  than  a program  for  retirement  savings managed
solely in the  interest  of the  fund contributors.  Similar concerns  have arisen with  the
insistence  of the  Committee  to  adopt  transfer  procedures  for  pension  accounts  that
particularly  slow down transfers  from the SAF to NSAFs.  While  the authorities  have
reiterated  that  the  complex  transfer  measures were  intended  to  protect  contributors
from unauthorized  removal of assets, they effectively stopped asset flows from the SAF
after fund  liquidity  had  been seriously  reduced.  The development  of an independent
regulatory  agency,  similar  to  the  NBK,  would  reduce  the  possibility  of  actual  or
perceived  Government  interference.  A unified  agency would  also be able to  provide
simplified reporting  and filing standards for annual or quarterly  reports.
Another  issue that  needs to be resolved is the provision  of banking services by
custodian  banks  for  the  NSAFs  and  AMCs.  The  Central  Depository  is the  actual
46custodian  for  assets other  than  Eurobonds,  and  banks  involved  in  Eurobond
transactions are the defacto custodians  of the Eurobonds. These issues  need to be acted
upon  to  ensure the  safety of pension fund  holdings before unscrupulous persons
challenge the  integrity of the system through party-in-interest dealings or  outright
theft.
4.  The Administrative  Structure
The two non-regulatory agencies  involved  in the pension system are the SPPC
and the SAF.  The SPPC has never lived up to its potential as a clearinghouse  for the
funded system. The SAF is still a public entity with the risk that its investments may
serve other purposes than the maximization  of assets  for future pensioners.
State  Pension  Payment Center.  The first tasks the SPPC must complete are the
clean up  of  the  SIC file and the  issuance of  SICs.  Many  duplicate SICs are
outstanding; further work is needed to issue identification numbers to  all adults of
working age if contributions are ever to be collected  from the informal sector.  While
Government initially underestimated  the urgency of SIC development,  the necessity  to
issue SICs to  the entire population is now taken seriously. Government plans to use
information from the  1999 Census of the  Population to  register the  working-age
population.  Government  has accepted assistance  through  USAID to  clean up  and
merge duplicate accounts  working through the SAF and SPPC.
One of the drawbacks of the former PAYGO pension system was its inability
to  collect more than  half of all payments due.  To  change this situation, the  tax
authorities are planning to  consult with  the  SPPC and  other agencies to  identify
individuals and businesses  that avoid or evade their obligations. For some time, inter-
agency meetings have been held to determine whether to use the SIC for tax collection
purposes or to develop a crosswalk  between tax numbers and SICs. Unfortunately, no
agreement has been reached.  If a single identification number were used across the
47board, the tax  authorities' enforcement capacity would be vastly improved, as the
personal income tax base could be reconciled with  the  SPPC's pension contributor
base. In other words, the SPPC could play a significant role in the identification of
taxpayers. To date, the SPPC has not been an active partner, as management  was given
no mandate to undertake this function.
Soviet accounting  practices  that are not in keeping with international standards
were used by the PAYGO pension system to track pension payments. These practices,
in combination with  decentralized collection and payment of benefits, and minimal
reporting requirements, prevented the MLSP from having any fiscal control of the
pension system prior  to  the  reform. To  ensure fiscal accountability, international
accounting  and auditing  standards need to be established  in the SPPC. An independent
audit  conducted  by  KPMG  indicated  that  substantial  improvements  in  SPPC
accounting  practices  are still needed and should be an SPPC priority.
The  SPPC has never  lived up  to  its potential  as a  pension clearinghouse.
Currently, employees must notify their employers of their choice of pension fund;
their employers then submit the information to the SPPC along with each employee's
SIC. Probably most employees in  a  company belong to  a plan  selected by  their
employer.  While  the  development  of  employer-based pensions  provides  scale
economies in  marketing  and  administration, the  Kazakhstan pension  reform  is
officially based on  individual choice.  If employees could change funds byr simply
notifying the new fund of their selections,  employers would not need to prcovide  the
information  to  the  SPPC.  The  SPPC  would  make  the  change  and  act  as  a
clearinghouse  for all transactions.  Clearinghouse functions have been developed in
many countries including Latvia and Sweden. Without this function, little is gained  by
siphoning off collections  through the SPPC.
48The information  technology  of the SPPC has been developed in-house with the
help of local experts. 38 Because of the  changing roles of the SPPC,  a useful MIS has
never  been  developed.  In  particular,  hardware  and  software  has  been  developed
without  a strategic view  of the  functions  of the  organization.  As a result, the  SPPC
produces  reams of computerized  reports  but  few of any interest to  a manager wishing
to improve,  monitor,  and develop operational policies.  Until the focus of the SPPC is
based on a core set of functions,  and the purpose  of information  technology  (IT) is to
carry out these mandates, the SPPC will continue to struggle ineffectively. 3
State Accumulation  Fund.  Under  the  original  concept  of the  pension  reform,
the  SAF was to  be a fallback fund  for those  workers  who were  wary  of the private
sector.  The intent  of restricting  investment  options for the fund was to  provide a safe
haven for  risk-averse contributors,  and one that  would  not  compete with  the private
sector.  The  issuance of  the  illiquid  5-year bonds  and their  acceptance by  the  SAF
raised  doubts  about  its  independence.  Consequently,  recommendations  have  been
made to  have independent  private-sector  AMCs  invest funds for  the  SAF under  the
same limited portfolio  guidelines.  This system is to be used under the Latvian pension
reform.  While the decision of Government  to place asset management within the SAF
was an  improvement,  as it removed  a potential  conflict  of interest  for the  NBK,  the
SAF is not fully independent  of government  pressure.  Given the governance structure
38 Unlike countries like Argentina, which close  to select international consultants to establish
their data operations to support pension reform, regulatory and operational agencies  in
Kazakhstan never considered  tendering to international consultants. In part, the lack of
interest in outside IT support was a result of the very successful  IT applications  for the
NBK undertaken by Kazakhstan experts.  As NBK specialists  were also involved in the
pension reform, they did not consider that technical assistance  was necessary. Further,
implicit  government policy  has  always been to  avoid spending funds for  technical
assistance  whenever possible.
3  An additional problem appears to be the wage structure for the IT operations, which is not
sufficient to  reward  senior IT  professionals.  It  has been recommended elsewhere a
separate pay scale for IT specialists  be provided throughout Government to ensure high-
quality long-term staff. Separate salary  scales  for selected  professions  in short-supply  have
been used by governments around the world.  An alternative solution suggested  by the
authorities, that of starting a joint-stock company for IT management,  is less transparent
and  could create a monopoly  outside of  government control dealing with  sensitive
government documents.
49of the SAF, the context for political interference is obvious.  Further, the opportunity
to  balance interests even within government and the  NBK  and provide  practical
oversight has been slight, as the Board of Directors does not meet regularly.
Plans are being developed  to  privatize the SAF after its asset base declines to
about one third of the total. This would be excellent if privatization is transparent and
based on competitive bidding procedures.  Further, to  ensure that  investments are
made purely in the interest of contributors, the state should completely divest itself of
SAF holdings.
B.  World Bank  Involvement
Pension reform in Kazakhstan was designed and developed by  Kazakhstan's
officials  and legislators. As such, it is original to Kazakhstan.  Although Kazakhstan
officials  were fully cognizant of the World Bank's volume, Averting the Old Age Crisis,
they did not use World Bank technical assistance  in the development of their pension
concept paper.  In fact, the authorities chastised the Bank for not providing prompt
enough  support.  Further,  while  the  USAID  encouraged a  radical reform,  the
champions of  the  reform  accepted USAID  technical  assistance only  when  they
considered it productive.  The new  law was very much  the  result of a  group of
reformers  who  sought  to  implement  the  three-pronged  development  strategy
announced in  1997 - privatization, capital market development and pension reform.
Those reformers understood that an incremental reform of the PAYGO system was
not possible as it faced too much political opposition.  In addition, as the reformers
came  from the financial  sectors,  financial  imperatives  for the reform were stressed.
Pre-reform.  In March 1997,  it became  clear to the Bank that pension reform was
underway.  The Bank responded  to the request of Government for comments on the
initial design of the system.  Bank comments identified concerns related to  (a) the
benefit structure, (b) the rapid pace of the reform, and (c) the lack of financial sector
and regulatory experience. Nonetheless, from the start the response of the Bank was
50to support the structure of the reform, as it was close to that suggested  in Averting the
Old Age Crisis. Following the passage  of the pension reform legislation  in June 1997,  a
preparation mission was sent to Kazakhstan to assess  the advisability of providing an
adjustment loan and present recommendations  to Bank management.
The Bank had one of two options.  It could support the Kazakhstan pension
reform with an adjustment loan, including stringent conditionalities to ensure that the
reform was successful,  or  not support the  reform on  the premise that it could not
succeed.  A decision was taken to  support  the  reform, as the  basic structure was
considered sound as long as Government agreed  to strong conditionalities and accepted
technical assistance  provided though the Bank to ensure that the Loan conditions could
be met.  Further, to  ensure transparency, all possible pitfalls and deficiencies  of the
reform were to be documented  to assist  Government and apprise Bank management  of
these risks. In other words, assistance  was provided to the Government of Kazakhstan
knowing the risks of supporting the  Government's policy.  The end result of these
deliberations was to grant the Republic of Kazakhstan the PRAL in  1998 combined
with the PRIL.
Post-reform.  Since the enactment of the pension reform, considerable progress
has been made in its implementation with the second tranche of the PRAL released  in
December 1999. Initially, that implementation appeared to  be bound for disaster as
regulatory offices  were unqualified to  act as regulators and computer equipment was
insufficient to handle the barrage of data making its way through the system.  With
time, more Government officials  began to  realize the enormity of the task that had
undertaken.  With time, professionalism  in both regulation and administration started
to  take hold. With the  assistance of international donors,  including the  ADB, the
World Bank, and USAID, the Kazakhstan  pension system began to stabilize.
This  is not to  say that there  are no  further problems.  The challenges are
tremendous, as are the challenges  in many other areas  if full employment and sustained
economic growth is to  become a reality.  The external shock of the  Russian crisis
51unambiguously slowed down the pace of the pension reform.  If the reform is to  be
sustainable,  more progress will need to be made in the area of regulation and portfolio
diversification. The commitment of the authorities to building a strong private-sector
economy will be the deciding factor in determining whether or not government efforts
are focused  on regulation rather than control.  As with the Chilean reform, success  will
only be apparent after a decade of operation, for pension reform requires a long-term
commitment - hopefully, one which will be kept in Kazakhstan.
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55IAnnex  Table  1: SCENARiO  SUMMARY  TABLE
Scenarious  Baseline:  Reformed Pension  System  Baseline:  Continuing  Solidarity  System
'  Base Year 1998
GOP  1,747,720  million tenge in 1998 (Information from the Ministry of Finance)  1,747,720 million tenge in 1998 (Information from the Ministry of Finance)
Picnsion  Fund Balance  Zero bilance  in the beginning of 1998 (Information from the Ministryof  Finance)  Zero balance in the beginning of 1  998 (informalIon from the Ministry of Finance
Reference Wage: Male  Average monthly wage for males in 1998 - 10,904 lenge (NSA)  Average monthly wage for males in 1998-  10,904 lenge (NSA)
Reference  Wage! Female  Average monthly wage for females in 1999- 8,260tenge  (NSA)  Average monthly wags for females in 1999 -8,260  tenge (NSA)
Total Pension Payments to  Male Old Age  25,209 million lenge in 1998 (MnLabor,  -94withoutfavorable  terms and"dead souls")_  25,209 million tenge in1998  (MinLabor,  -94 without favorable terms and "dead souls")---
Total Pension Payments to  Femalie  Old Age  44,675 million tenge In 1998 (MinLabor.  -94 without favorable terms and "dead souls"')  44,675 million tenge in 1998 (MmnLabor, -94 without favorable terms and "dead souls")
Total Pension Payments to  Male Favorable  12,697.07  million tenge in 1998 (MinLabor,  -94); 'dead  souls" added  12,697.07 million tenge in 1998 (MinLabor.  -94);"dead  souls" added
Total Pension  Payments to  Female Favorable  i2,285.67 million lenge  in 1998 (MmLabor,  -94); "dead souls" added  12;285.67 million tenge in 1998 (MinLabor,  -94); "dead souls" added
_______________________________________  ~~~~Demographic  Trends
Sex Ratio at Birth  (boysi10G  girls)  105.74 ("Female and Children of RKi, 1998, NatStatAgency, p 9)  105,74 ("Female and Children of RK-, 1998, NatStatAgency, p 9)
Mortality Rate Muitiplier(%):  Contributors  100% (same as overall population mortality)  100% (same as overall population mortality)
Old Age  b-100%  (same as overall population mortality)  100% (same as overall population mortality)
Favorable  100%  (same as overall population mortality)  100% (same as overall population mo_aiity)
Survivors-  100% (same as overall population mortality)  100% (same as overall population moriality)
Disabled  100% (same as overali population mortality)  100% (same as overali populaiion mortality)
Macroeconomic  Trends
GDP  Growth (at Market Price, Real)  1998 -(-2.5%); 1999 -(-1.5%); 0.5% in 2000, 3% in 2001-2030, 3 5% in 2031-2039, and 4% thereafter  1998 - (-2.5%); 1999 - (-1.5%); 0.5% in 2000, 3% in  2001-2030, 3.5% in 2031-2039, and 4%
Productivity  Growth  1998-i4.8%, 1999- 0.0%; 0.9% in 2000-2010;1.9% inr2011-2015; 26%  in 2016-2030; 3.0% in 2031-  1998 -4.6%; 1999-  00%o;  0.9% in 2000-2010; 1.9% in 2011-2015; 26%  in 2016-2030, 3.0% in
. 2035; 3.3% in 2036-2039;  3.8%/ in 2040; and 4.0% thereafter  2031-2035; 3.3% In 2036-2039, 3.8% in 2040, and 4 0%/  thereafter
Inflation Rate  1998 - 1.9% (actual); 1999 - 21.8%; 2000 -9.0%; 2001 - 5.9%/6,  2002 - 4%, and 3.2%  thereafter  1998-  1.9°%  (actual); 1999 - 21.8%; 2000 -9 0%; 200i  - 5.9%, 2002 - 4%, and 3 2% ihereafler
z  Real  Interest  Rate  1998 -14.4°,  1999gg  10%;2  2000 -7.5i-n2  4%  thereafter  1998 -a14-2%0  1999 -10%; 2000 - 7.5%;  5% thereafter
General budget transfers  as percent of  GDP  We assume zero  We assume zero
O  Other Income as % of contribution  revenue  We assume zero  We assume zero
o  Other  expense as % of pension  expense  We assume zero  We assume zero
Retirement Age
Male  1998 - 61.5; 1999 -62; 2000 -62.5; 2001-2050 -63 (Pension Law of RK, Article 9)  1998 - 61.5;  1999 -62; 2000 -62.5;  2001-2050 -63 (Pension Law of RK, Article 9)
Female  1998 - 58.5; 1999 -57;  2000 -57.5: 2001-2050 -58  (Pension Law  of RK, Article  9)  1998 -56.5;  1999 -57;  2000 -57.5;  2001-2050 -58  (Pension Law of  RK, Article 9)
Length  of service  at retirement
Male  _._  40 years in 1998 with gradual decrease to 0 in 2043  40 years for the whole projection period
Female  135 years in 1998 with gradual decrease to 0 in 2038  35 years for the whole projection period
Pension  Contribution
Contribution  Rate  21% in 1999, General Revenue financing thereafter  25% for the whole projection period
collection  Rate  11998  -63%; General Revenue financing thereafter  1998-  63%; 1999- 73%, then the rate goes up to 85% in 2010;85%  thereafter
Replacement Rate
Survivors  1998 -39.8%; declines lo 22.4% in 2030 (the decline is due lo the assumed real wage growth and zero  1998 - 39 8%: declines to 22 4% in 2030 (the declirne  is due io Ihe assurned real wage growth and
real growth rate of the base numerate); and then recovers to 33.2% in 2050 due to the assumed real  zero real growth rate of the base numerate); and then recovers to 33.2% in 2050 due to the
growth of the base numerate  assumed real arowth of the base numerate
Disabled  1998 - 30.2%; declines to 20.3% in 2030 (the decline is due to the  assumed real wage growth and zero  1998 - 30.2%; declines to 20 3% in 2030 (the decline is due to the assumed real wage growth and
real growth rate of the base numerate): and then recovers to 30.2% in 2050 due to the assumed real  zero real growth rale of the base numerate); and then recovers to 30.2% in 2050 due to lhe
growth  of the base nuimerate  P  assumed real  growth  of the base numerate
Pension  Indexation  I(%)  _________________________________________
Inflation  1998-2020  - 78.5%; then goes up to 100% in 2030 (corresponds to 100% indexation of minimum  1998-2020 -78.5%; then goes up to a080%  in  2020 and to 100% in 2030 (conesponds to 100%
pension); zero in 2031-2050  1  indexation of minimum pension); zero in 2031-2050
Nominal Wage Growth  L  Zero in 1998-2030; 80% in 2031-2035; goes up to 90% in 2040; 90% afterwards  Zero in 1998-2030, 80% irn  2031-2035, goes up to 90% in 2040; 90% afterwards
Weight of Economy Wide Wage for  Entry  100%  100%
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Scenarious  Baseline: Refofmed Pension  System  Baseline: Continuing Solidarity System
A minstratfve  Cost
i  Transactions as % of  eapensers  1998 transactions cost - 2.9% of totat expenditures o1  pension system; same  tevel assumed for the whote  1998 transactions cost - 2.9% ol toial expenditures ot pension system; same level assumed for
projection period  the whole projection period
z  Asseta Management  1998 asset management cost-  1%  of totat assets; same sevet  assumed for the whole projection period  1998 asset management cost - 1% of total assets; same level assumed for the whole projection
W  Rstes  of Retumns
Investment Retums  1998 - 14.4%; 1999  - 10%;  declines to 5% in 2005; stays at 5% thereafter  -1999  14.4%; 1999  10%; declines to 5% in 2005; stays at 5% thereafter
For the Whole Projection Period
z  Population  End of 1998 population computed based on end of 1997 age/sex distribution, 1997 mortality rates, and  End of  1998 population computed based oxi  eird of 1997 age/sex distribution, 1997 mortality rates.
0  ~  ~  ~  ~~-1998  migraiion  and  1998  migration
Fertlity  1997 total fertility rate of 1.86 maintained up to year 2005; gradual rise to replacement fertility (TFR=2.10)  1997 total fertility rate of 1  .86 maintained uip  to year 2005; gradual rise to replacement fertility
by 2010; stable thereafter  (TFR=2.10) by 2010; stable thereafter
Probability  of dying  GGradual  convergence from 1997 high mortality rates to  1987 level by 2010; stabe  thereafer  Gradual convergence from 1997 high mortality rates to 1987 level by 2010; stable thereafter
IL  immigration  1998 - (-1.0 O/o) net migration; converges to zero by 2005; gradually goes up to 0.6% in 2015; stable at  1998 - (-1.0 %) net migration; converges to zero by 2005; gradually goes up to 0.6% in 2015;
0.6% thereafter  stable at 0.6% thereafter
For the Whole Projection Period
Labor Participation  rate  1997 labor force participation rate was 84.4%; same LFPR is maintained for the whole projection period  1997 labor force participation rate was 84.4%; same LFPR is maintained for the whole projection
0  ~~~~~~~(1998-2050)  . period  (1998-2050) 
ct  Unemplo)yment  1998  -13.7%/;  1999 -13.5%; declines to 7% in 2010; and 7% thereafter  1l98  -(13.7°;0 1999  -13.5%; declines to 7% in 2010o  and 7% thereafter
Earning Profile  1998 profile computed based on data provided by the State Center tor Benefit Payments. It is maintained  1998 profile computed based on data provided by thie  Stati  Center for Benefit Payments. It is
for the  whole projection period  maintained for the whole projection period
Pension  System  In 1998
1998 Contributors  1998 age/sex distribution data from the State Center for Benefit Payments  1998 age/sex distribution data from the State Center for Benefit Payments
1998 Oid Age  1998 distribution prepared based on RIC-94 and 1-SOBES  reports provided by the Ministry of Labor  1998 distribution prepared based on RIC 94 and 1-SOBES reports provided by the Ministry of
1998 Disabled  1998 distribution prepared based on 1-SOBES report provided by the Ministry of Labor  1998 distribution prepared based on 1-SOBES report provided by the Minisiry of Labor
1998 Survivors  1998 distribution prepared based on 1-SOBES report provided by the Ministry of Labor  1998 distributio l prepared based oni  1-SOBES report provided by the Ministry of Labor
i1iS  Favorable  1998 distribution prepared based on RIC-94 report provided by the Ministry of Labor; favorable  group  i998  distribution prepared based on RIC 94 report provided by the Ministry of Labor; favorable
consists of early retirees and "dead  souls"; the tatter  accomodated to age cohort '75  g0oup  consists of early relirees  and "dead  souls"; the latter  accomodated to age cohort >75
As % of Poputation for the Whote Projection Period
Contributors  as % of Population (inputted  as  1998 - 52% (computed based oni  data from the State Center for Benefit Payments); 1999 - 43 8% (NSA  1998 - 52% (comrputed  based on data fomm  the State Center for Benefit Payments); 1999 -43.8%
effective contributors  fortmal  sector as % of  data); then formal sector share in total employment is assumed to grow to 75% in 2030 and then  stay at  (NSA data);  then lormai sector share in total einployment is assumed to grow to 
7
5%/o  In 2030 and
poplulatlon)  75%  then stay at 75%
O  Old Age as  o  of Populatien  Current rate (based on 1998) Is maintained for the whole projection period  Current rate (based on 1998) is irrairitained for the whole projection period
ri  Disabled  as % of Population  1998 rates for males maintained for the whole projection period, except for 1942-44 effect; 1998 rates for  1998 rates for irrales maintained for the whole projection period, except for  1942-44 effect; 1998
iZ  females under 23 maintained for the whole projection period; female rates for age cohorts over  23  rates for females under 23 rriaitnained for the whole projection period; female rates for age
ab  _  converge gradually to male rates by 2050  cohorts over 23 converge gradiually  to mal  rates by 2050
Survivors  as  % of Population  1998 rates maintained for the whole projection period  1998 rates maintained for the whole projection period
Favorabie as % of Population  No new favorables  assumed beginning 1999; 1998 favorabtes assumed to age over the legal retirement  No new favorables assunmed  beginning  1999; 1998 favorables assumed to age over the legal
age gradually at sumviving  rate by 2016 for mates and 2011 for females; "dead soils"  as percent of  retirenrent age gradtially at survivirng  rate by 2016 for males and 2011 for fenrales; "dead souls"
population decline gradually to 0% in 2016 for males and  as percent of populatiosi  decline gradually to 0% in 2016 for males and
Evasion and Emption  Rate (%)  Asumed to be zero for the whole projection period as effective contributors are entered in the contribitlors  Asumed to be zero for the whole projection period as effective contributors are entered in the
as-%-of-population sectioni  contributors-as-%-of-population section
Replacement Rate  for New Old Age  1998 RR for new and existing old-age pensioners computed based on RIC-94 report: for  1998-2050, RR  1998 RR for new and existing old-age pensioners computed based on RIC-94 report; for 1998-
was estimated based on macroeconomic projections (formal sector share and unemployment) RR goes  2050. RR was eslirnal,ed basedt  nri  rmr-,- rrnrnir-  prnjonisen  (f-rmnl  -enr  nHarr  and
-town will) declirrinq number ot vears  ir service ini  solidarit  unemptooment).  RR goes down with  declining number of years  in service in solidarit
Replacement  Rate for  New Favorabte  No new favorables assumed beginning 1998. pension for existing favorable is indexed according to tire  No new favorables assumed beginning  1998, pension for existing favorable is indexed according
labove  schedule  (see  pension  indexation  section)  'to lte  above  schedrlne  (see  perision  indexation  section)
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1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2010
Total  Population  15,503.7  15,445.6  15,413.1  15,406.7  15,426.8  15,474.0  15,549.0  15,652.9  16,483.6
Population  Growth  Rate  (0.4)  (0.2)  (0.0)  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.3
Share  of People  above  Ret.  Age in Population  11.5  11.3  10.6  10.6  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.6  11.2
Old  Age Population  Dependence  67.3  64.5  61.0  58.8  56.7  54.6  53.1  51.9  49.9
Life  Expectancy  at  Birth:  Male  59.0  59.5  59.9  60.4  60.9  61.4  62.0  62.5  65.7
Life  Expectancy  at Birth:  Female  70.2  70.6  71.0  71.4  71.8  72.3  72.7  73.2  76.4
Life  Expectancy  at  Retirement:  Male  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.3  12.6  12 8  13.1  14.7
Life  Expectancy  at  Retirement:  Female  20.5  20.4  20.4  20.3  20.7  21.1  21.5  21.9  24.7
Macroeconomic Environment
GDP  Growth  Rate  -2.5%  -1.5%  .5%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%
Real  GDP  1,747,720.0  1,721,504.3  1,730,111.8  1,782,015.1  1,835,475.6  1,890,539.9  1,947,256.1  2,005,673.8  2,325,125.3
Nominal  GDP  1,747,720.0  2,096,792.1  2,297,141.5  2,504,470.0  2,682,014.5  2,850,874.0  3,030,365.0  3,221,156.8  4,371,157.0
Real  Interest  Rate  16.7%  10.0%  9.2%  8.3%  7.5%  6.7%  5.8%  5.0%  5.0%
Nominal  Interest  Rate  18.9%  34.0%  19.0%  14.7%  11.8%  10.1%  9.2%  8.4%  8.4%
Inflation  Rate  1.9%  21.8%  9.0%  5.8%  4.0%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%
Price  Index  1.0  1.2  1.3  114  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.9
Productivity  Growth  4.6%  .9%  .9%  .9%  .9%  .9%  .9%
Avg. Nominal  Wage  of Effective  Contributors  114.0  141.1  154.3  165.2  173.5  180.7  188.0  195.6  240.9
Effective Contributor  Real Wage Growth  1.6%  .3%  1.1%  1.0%  .9%  .8%  .8%  1.0%
Total  Labor  Force  7,315.5  7,388.9  7,500.6  7,619.6  7,738.8  7,866.5  8,010.1  8,167.2  8,978.3
Labor  Force  Participation  Rate  47.2  47.8  48.7  49.5  50.2  50.8  51.5  52.2  54.5
Total  Nominal  Contributors  3,318.5  2,800.0  2,927.8  3,061.9  3,199.9  3,348.3  3,492.4  3,648.8  4,543.7
Total  Effective  Contributors  3,318.5  2,800.0  2,927.8  3,061.9  3,199.9  3,348.3  3,492.4  3,648.8  4,543.7
Wage  Bill: All Employees  691,136.9  853,437.4  952,308.4  1,040,830.6  1,115,786.1  1,187,530.5  1,265,766.0  1,351,942.5  1,901,769.0
Wage  Bill: male  453,238.7  558,432.0  620,363.3  675,607.1  720,592.3  763,157.0  810,420.6  863,452.8  1,209,961.1
Wage  Bill:  female  237,898.2  295,005.4  331,945.1  365,223.6  395,193.8  424,373.5  455,345.4  488,489.8  691,807.8
Average  Nominal  Wage  109.5  133.5  145.8  155.8  163.3  169.8  176.6  183.7  227.8
Total  as % of Nominal  GDP  39.5%  40.7%  41.5%  41.6%  41.6%  41.7%  41.8%  42.0%  43.5%
Wage  Bill: Nominal  Contributors  378,398.1  395,090.7  451,711.6  505,738.5  555,038.5  604,926.4  656,486.1  713,784.1  1,094,546.6
Wage  Bill: male  207,650.9  240,744.8  274,338.5  307,185.0  336,245.3  365,190.6  395,159.7  429,137.9  664,076.9
Wage  Bill: female  170,747.2  154,345.9  177,373.1  198,553.5  218,793.2  239,735.8  261,326.4  284,646.3  430,469.7
Average  Nominal  Wage  114.0  141.1  154.3  165.2  173.5  180.7  188.0  195.6  240,9
Total as  % of Nominal  GDP  21.7%  18.8%  19.7%  20.2%  20.7%  21.2%  21.7%  22.2%  25.0%
Contributors'  Wage  Bill  as % of Employees'  Wage  54.8%1  46.3%  47.4%  48.6%°  49.7%  50.9%  51.9%  52.8%1  57.6%Annex  Table  2:  Kazakhstan:  Economic  and Demographic  Indicators  (con't)
2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Total Population  17,691.7  18,833.4  19,788.7  20,631.4  21,458.6  22,271.3  23,014.9  23,651.8
Population Growth  Rate  1.4  11  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5
Share of People above Ret. Age in Population  12.6  14.3  15.7  16.5  17.5  18.5  19.8  21.2
Old Age Population Dependence  55.6  606  61.7  59.6  60.5  63.7  68.3  71.8
Life Expectanicy at Birth: Male  657  657  65.7  65.7  65.7  65.7  65 7  65.7
Life Expectancy at Birth: Female  76.4  76.4  76.4  76.4  764  76.4  76.4  76.4
Life Expectancy  at Retirement:  Male  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7  14.7
Life Expectancy  at Retirement:  Female  24.7  24.7  24.7  24.7  24.7  24.7  24.7  24.7
Macroeconomic Environment
GDP  Growth  Rate  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.5%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%
Real  GDP  2,695,457.3  3,124,773.8  3,622,469.3  4,199,434.5  4,987,61  0.5  5,952,334.0  7,241,924.5  8,810,908.0
Nominal  GDP  5,931,724.5  8,049,438.5  10,923,209.0  14,822,956.0  20,607,962.0  28,789,112.0  41,000,908.0  58,392,708.0
Real  Interest  Rate  5.0%  5.0%  5.0%  5.0%  50%  5.0%  5.0%  5.0%
Nominal  Interest  Rate  8.4%  8.4%  8.4%  8.4%  8.4%  8.4%  8.4%  8.4%
Inflation  Rate  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%
Price Index  2.2  2.6  3.0  3.5  4.1  4.8  5.7  6.6
Productivity  Growth  1.9%  2.6%  2.6%  2.6%  3.0%  3.8%  4.0%  4.0%
Avg. Nominal  Wage  of Effective  Contributors  312.4  418.5  557.6  741.2  1,007.9  1,396.9  1,986.8  2,826.2
Effective  Contributor  Real  Wage  Growth  2.1%  2.7%  2.6%  2.6%  3.0%  3.8%  4.0%  4.0%
Total  Labor  Force  9,461.0  9,771.5  10,089.2  10,574.4  10,976.3  11,218.3  11,326.7  11,417.5
Labor  Force  Participation  Rate  53.5  51.9  51.0  51.3  51.2  504  49.2  48.3
Total  Nominal  Contributors  5,274.1  5,899.8  6,581.5  7,358.6  7,667.7  7,881.9  7,951.7  7,963.1
Total  Effective  Contributors  5,274.1  5,899.8  6,581.5  7,358.6  7,667.7  7,881.9  7,951.7  7,963.1
Wage Bill: All Employees  2,634,414.0  3,646,230:3  5,004,841.0  6,954,983.0  9,834,029.0  13,995,674.0  20,138,270.0  28,791,360.0
Wage Bill:  male  1,685,139.0  2,343,426.5  3,206,009.5  4,449,152.0  6,309,988.0  9,011,380.0  13,017,423.0  18,635.010.0
Wage  Bill:  female  949,275.0  1,302,803.8  1,798,831.4  2,505,831.0  3,524,041.0  4,984,293.5  7,120,847.0  10,156,351.0
Average  Nominal  Wage  299.1  401.1  533.2  706.1  960.7  1,335.9  1,903.6  2,704.1
Total as % of Nominal GDP  44.4%  45.3%  45.8%  46.9%  47.7%  48.6%  49.1%  49.3%
Wage Bill: Nominal Contributors  1,647,595.3  2,469,185.3  3,669,949.8  5,454,400.0  7,728,587.0  11,010,418.0  15,798,298.0  22,505,156.0
Wage Bill:  male  1,011,227.9  1,530,251.5  2,267,988.3  3,374,403.5  4,812,327.0  6,896,428.0  9,934,335.0  14,151,066.0
Wage Bill:  female  636,367.3  938,933.7  1,401,961.5  2,079,996.4  2,916,259.8  4,113,989.5  5,863,962.5  8,354,089.5
Average  Nominal  Wage  312.4  418.5  557.6  741.2  1,007.9  1,396.9  1,986.8  2,826.2
Total  as % of Nominal  GDP  27.8%  30.7%  33.6%  36.8%  37.5%  38.2%  38.5%  38.5%
Contributors  Wage  Bill as % of Employees  Wage  62.5%°  67.7%  73.3%  78.4%  78.6%°  78.7'S  78.4%  78.2%Annex Table 3: Kazakhstan:  Summary  for New System
1998  1  999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2010
Total Beneficiaries  2,582.0  2,496.1  2,436.9  2,349.7  2,303.5  2,265.6  2,238.1  2,219.2  2,245.4
Old Age  1,490.1  1,476.9  1,434.0  1,393.2  1,390.9  1,391.2  1,405.4  1,425.3  1,574.3
Favorable  5  1  5.5  429.3  396.8  342.4  297.2  256.8  214.0  174.1  41.8
Survivors  232.2  231.6  232.1  233.5  235.7  238.6  242.1  245.9  266.9
Disabled  344.2  358.3  373.9  380.5  379.8  378.9  376.6  373.9  362.4
Old Age-Effective Contributors  Ratio  44.9  52.7  49.0  45.5  43.5  41.6  40.2  39.1  34.6
Total  Beneficiaries-Effective  Contributors  Ratio  77.8  89.1  83.2  76.7  72.0  67.7  64.1  60.8  49.4
Total Expenditure  120,718.6  138,314.7  145,243.7  147,017.3  149,865.4  152,448.0  155,995.0  160,293.4  194,291.8
Total Pension Benefits  117,244.4  134,334.2  141,063.7  142,786.3  145,552.4  148,060.7  151,505.6  155,680.3  188,700.2
Benefits for Old Age  69,884.0  81,752.1  85,386.9  87,236.1  90,91 8.4  94,403.7  99,045.4  104,233.9  137,667.1
Benefits for Favorable  24,982.7  24,324.7  24,019.4  21,545.1  19,136.7  16,854.2  14,390.2  12,053.4  3,587.6
Benefits for Survivors  10,5 31.1  13,000.1  14,246.7  1  5,206.7  15,970.7  16,692.3  17,464.5  18,292.0  2  3,3 70.7
Benefits for Disabled  11,846.6  15,257.3  17,410.8  18,798.4  19,526.6  20,110.4  20,605.5  21,101.0  24,074.9
Relative  to GDP
Pension Payments As % of GDP  6.7%  6.4%  6.1%  5.7%  5.4%  5.2%  5.0%  4.8%  4.3%
Total  Expenditure As %  of GDP  6.9%  6.6%  6.3%  5.9%  5.6%  5.3%  5.1%  5.0%  4.4%
Avg pension  -Average  Wage Ratio  41.1  39.2  38.6  37.9  37.7  37.6  37.5  37.4  36.3Annex Table 3: Kazakhstan:  Summary  for New System (con't)
... __________________________________  .2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Total Beneficiaries  2,586.8  2,666.9  2,752.4  2,838.9  2,925.1  4,375.0  4,765.5  5,1 33.9
Old Age  1,902.0  1,976.9  2,057.4  2,140.2  2,223.7  3,553.7  3,934.3  4,318.1
Favorable  2.2
Survivors  290.8  293.7  295.2  295.5  294.8  303.1  314.1  313.5
Disabled  391.8  396.3  399.9  403.2  406.5  518.2  51 7.1  502.2
Old Age--Effective Contributors  Ratio  36.1  36.6  37.2  37.8  38.5  45.1  49.5  54.2
Total Beneficiaries-Effective  Contributors  Ratio  49.0  49.4  49.8  50.2  50.6  55.5  59.9  64.5
Total Expenditure  269,073.9  285,429.2  304,904.6  323,972.7  341,585.5  790,540.6  1,065,340.3  1,524,893.4
Total Pension Benefits  261,330.3  277,214.9  296,129.8  314,649.1  331,755.0  767,789.7  1,034,680.9  1,481,008.5
Benefits for Old Age  200,438.2  213,875.0  230,165.7  246,150.0  260,793.0  472,937.1  565,91 9.9  758,392.8
Benefits for Favorable  242.0
Benefits  for Survivors  29,992.7  3  1,298.2  32,527.7  33,655.2  34,679.5  1  15,474.4  187,812.7  294,242.4
Benefits  for Disabled  30,657.4  32,041.7  33,436.4  34,843.9  36,282.5  179,378.2  280,948.3  428,373.4
Relative  to GDP
Pension  Payments  As %  of GDP  4.4%  4.4%  4.4%  4.4%  4.4%  2.7%  2.5%  2.5%
Total Expenditure  As %  of GDP  4.5%  4.5%  4.5%  4.5%  4.5%  2.7%  2.6%  2.6%
Avg  pension  - Average  Wage  Ratio  33.7  32.7  31.9  30.9  29.7  9.5  7.2  6.2Annex Table 4:  Kazakhstan  Summary  for Old System
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2010
Total Beneficiaries  2,582.0  2,496.1  2,436.9  2,349.7  2,303.5  2,265.6  2,238.1  2,219.2  2,245.4
Old Age  1,490.1  1,476.9  1,434.0  1,393.2  1,390.9  1,391.2  1,405.4  1,425.3  1,574.3
Favorable  5  1  5.5  429.3  396.8  342.4  297.2  256.8  214.0  1  74.1  41.8
Survivors  232.2  231.6  232.1  233.5  235.7  238.6  242.1  245.9  266.9
Disabled  344.2  358.3  373.9  380.5  379.8  378.9  376.6  373.9  362.4
Old Age-Effective  Contributors  Ratio  44.9  52.7  49.0  45.5  43.5  41.6  40.2  39.1  34.6
Total Beneficiaries-Effective  Contributors  Ratio  77.8  89.1  83.2  76.7  72.0  67.7  64.1  60.8  49.4
Total Revenue  59,597.7  72,104.1  84,507.7  96,933.2  108,926.3  121,489.4  1  34,853.2  149,894.7  232,591.2
Contribution  Revenue  59,597.7  72,104.1  84,507.7  96,933.2  108,926.3  121,489.4  134,853.2  149,894.7  232,591.2
Total Expenditure  120,718.6  138,363.6  145,354.4  147,221.3  150,310.4  1  53,1  97.3  157,185.8  162,046.3  201,384.1
Total Pension Benefits  117,244.4  134,381.6  141,171.3  142,984.4  145,984.6  148,788.5  152,662.2  157,382.8  195,588.5
Benefits for Old Age  69,884.0  81,799.5  85,494.3  87,434.0  91,350.4  95,131.3  100,201.8  105,936.1  144,558.0
Benefits for Favorable  24,982.7  24,324.7  24,019.6  21,545.3  19,136.9  16,854.5  14,390.4  12,053.7  3,584.9
Benefits for Survivors  10,531.1  13,000.1  14,246.7  15,206.7  15,970.7  16,692.3  17,464.5  18,292.0  23,370.7
Benefits for Disabled  11,846.6  15,257.3  17,410.8  18,798.4  19,526.6  20,110.4  20,605.5  21,101.0  24,074.9
Relative  to GDP
Contribution  Revenue As % of GDP  3.4%  3.4%  3.7%  3.9%  4.1%  4.3%  4.5%  4.7%  5.3%
Total Revenue  As % of GDP  3.4%  3.4%  3.7%  3.9%  4.1%  4.3%  4.5%  4.7%  5.3%
Pension Payments As % of GDP  6.7%  6.4%  6.1%  5.7%  5.4%  5.2%  5.0%  4.9%  4.5%
Total Expenditure  As % of GDP  6.9%  6.6%  6.3%  5.9%  5.6%  5.4%  5.2%1  5.0%  4.6%
Avg pension  - Average  Wage Ratio  41.1  39.3  38.6  38.0  37.9  37.8  37.9  38.0  38.1Annex Table 4: Kazakhstan  Summary  for Old System (con't)
2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Total Beneficiaries  2,586.8  3,011.7  3,390.6  3,671.6  4,01  8.5  4,375.0  4,765.5  5,1  33.9
Old Age  1,902.0  2,309.1  2,681.8  2,932.7  3,238.3  3,553.7  3,934.3  4,31 8.1
Favorable  2.2
Survivors  290.8  292.9  276.2  270.0  282.7  303.1  314.1  313.5
Disabled  391.8  409.7  432.5  468.9  497.6  518.2  517.1  502.2
Old Age-Effective  Contributors  Ratio  36.1  39.1  40.7  39.9  42.2  45.1  49.5  54.2
Total Beneficiaries-Effective  Contributors  Ratio  49.0  51.0  51.5  49.9  52.4  5 S.5  59.9  64.5
Total Revenue  350,114.0  524,701.9  779,864.4  1,159,060.0  1,642,324.6  2,339,714.0  3,357,138.5  4,782,345.5
Contribution  Revenue  350,114.0  524,701.9  779,864.4  1,159,060.0  1,642,324.6  2,339,714.0  3,357,138.5  4,782,345.5
Total Expenditure  293,004.7  428,504.2  592,747.2  768,105.1  1,258,209.6  2,058,575.1  3,464,072.5  5,759,752.5
Total Pension Benefits  284,572.3  416,172.3  575,688.6  745,999.9  1,221,999.6  1,999,331.5  3,364,380.0  5,593,993.0
Benefits for Old Age  223,682.0  342,888.3  487,406.3  630,477.0  1,038,975.9  1,704,479.0  2,895,61 9.0  4,871,377.5
Benefits for Favorable  240.2
Benefits for Survivors  29,992.7  35,552.3  39,211.8  44,809.0  70,403.8  115,474.4  187,812.7  294,242.4
Benefits for Disabled  30,657.4  37,731.7  49,070.5  70,71 3.8  112,620.0  179,378.2  280,948.3  428,373.4
Relative  to GDP  ..  _
Contribution  Revenue As % of GDP  5.9%  6.5%  7.1%  7.8%  8.0%  8.1%  8.2%  8.2%
Total Revenue As % of GDP  5.9%  6.5%  7.1%  7.8%  8.0%  8.1%  8.2%  8.2%
Pension Payments As % of GDP  4.8%  5.2%  5.3%  5.0%  5.9%  6.9%  8.2%  9.6%
Total Expenditure As %  of GDP  4.9%  5.3%  5.4%  5.2%  6.1%  7.2%  8.4%  9.9%
Avg pension  -Average  Wage Ratio  37.6  35.5  32.6  29.0  31.8  34.3  37.0  39.9Social Protection Discussion Paper Series
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The  pension  reform  in  Kazakhstan  was  instituted  to  remove  a deteriorating
and  costly  pay-as-you-go  (PAYGO)  system  with  limited  revenues,  a relatively
low  worker  to  pensioner  ratio,  and  accumulating  pension  arrears.  Analysis
was  conducted  to  assess  whether  the  economy  could  sustain  a radical
reform,  which  would  make  the  implicit  pension  debt  explicit.
The  first  section  of  this  report  reviews  the  reform  and  provides  a synopsis
of  the  thinking  behind  its  development,  including  the  events  leading  up
to  it and  the  failings  of  the  PAYGO  system.  In  the  second  section,  the
administrative,  business,  and  regulatory  structures  created  by  the  pension
reform  legislation  are  described.  In  the  third  section,  the  progress  of  these  <
entities  in meeting  the  objectives  of  the  reform  is  evaluated,  particularly
in terms  of  regulatory  and  financial  market  performance.
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About  this series...
The  World  Bank  Pension  Reform  Primer  aims  to  provide  a timely  and  comprehensive  resource  for  those
engaged  in the  design  and  implementation  of pension  reforms  around  the  world.  Policymakers  and
those  who  advise  them  will find  useful  information  on  other  reform  experiences,  the  current  thinking
of  pension  specialists  and  a  vast  array  of  cross-country  evidence.  A  flexible  and  dynamic  format  ensure
that  key  developments  are  updated  as  they  occur.
The  World  Bank  set  out  a conceptual  framework  for  fundamental  pension  reform  in  Averting  the  Old
Age  Crisis:  Policies  to  Protect  the  Old  and  Promote  Growth.  This  study,  published  in 1994,  helped  shape
the  global  debate  about  the  impact  of  population  ageing  on  pension  systems.  The  Pension  Reform  Primer
builds  on  this  pioneering  work  and  on  the  experience  of  the  World  Bank  and  other  international
institutions  in the  last  five  years.  It focuses  on  practical  questions.
For  more  information,  please  contact  Social  Protection,  Human  Development  Network,  World  Bank,
1818  H Street  NW,Washington,  D.C.  20433;  telephone  +1202  458  5267;  fax  +1  202  614  0471;  e-nmail
socialprotection@worldbank.org.  All Pension  Reform  Primer  material  is  available  on  the  internet  at
www.worldbank.org/pensions